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The Business Records Exception to the

Hearsay Rule-New is Not Necessarily
Better
Sidney Kwestel*

I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most significant exceptions to the hearsay rule is the business
records exception.' With roots in the common law,2 it is based on the premise
that records made in the regular course of business are sufficiently reliable to
justify admitting them as proof of the matters asserted in them without the
safeguard of cross examination.3 Widespread acceptance of a codified business
records exception followed a 1927 study 4 that proposed such a statute (the Model
Act)' and urged its passage by everyjurisdiction.6 Congress, 7 as well as several

* © 1999. Sidney Kwestel, Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg
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former partner Michael Malina, Esq. of Kaye Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler and his
colleague Professor Eileen Kaufman and the assistance of Jill B. Selden, Stephanie
Hatzakos, Shawn Nelson, R. Stephanie Estevez and David Allweiss.
1. People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501, 507 (N.Y. 1986).
2. The exception is primarily grounded on the common law business entries rule
and the shop book doctrine. MORGAN ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS
FOR ITS REFORM 51 (1927) (hereinafter "MORGAN ET AL.") (advocating "proof of business

transactions to harmonize with current business practice").
3. See Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 341 (10th
Cir. 1995); Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d at 507; Crowder v. Aurora Co-op. Elevator Co., 393
N.W.2d 250, 258 (Neb. 1986) (holding that "routine record keeping, essential to the
conduct of business, produces the reliability necessary for admissibility of business
records"); Williams v. Alexander, 129 N.E.2d 417, 417-19 (N.Y. 1955).
The oft-quoted Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states:
The element of unusual reliability of business records is said variously
to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity
which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in
relying on them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a
continuing job or occupation.
56 F.R.D. 183, 308 (citation omitted).
4. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 51. The Legal Research Committee of the
Commonwealth Fund conducted the study. See Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517, 518
(N.Y. 1930).
5. The Model Act reads as follows:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
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states including New York,8 adopted the Model Act. Other states enacted
different versions of the business records exception,9 including the Uniform
Business Records Evidence Act (hereinafter UBRE) ° and former Section 63(13)

of the Uniform Rules of Evidence."
In 1975, Congress passed the comprehensive Federal Rules of Evidence,
which included Rule 803(6) (hereinafter 803(6)),12 a revised, but not necessarily
more liberal, version of the business records exception.' 3 Today the business
occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act,

transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was
made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular
course of such business to make it at the time of such act, transaction
occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other
circumstances of the making of such writing a record, including lack of
personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its
weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term 'business'
shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind.
MORGAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 63.
6. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 63.
7. Congress adopted the Act in 1936. 28 U.S.C. § 695 (1940) (recodified in 28

U.S.C. § 1732 (1994)).
8. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1561a (Chadboum rev. 1974).

9. Id.
10. UNIF. Bus. RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 1-6 (1965 and Supp.
1968). This Uniform Act was adopted in 1936 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, §1561a.
11. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1561a.
12. FED. R. EvID., PUB. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). Rule 803(6) reads as
follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
'business' as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted
for profit.
Id.
13. The language of 803(6) is no more liberal than its predecessor, Section 1732,
and in fact may be more restrictive. Under the Model Act, if a document satisfies the
foundation requirement for admissibility, all ofthe circumstances surrounding its making
may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility. On the other hand, under
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records exception is codified in15 virtually every jurisdiction, 4 with most
codifications patterned on 803(6).

803(6), even if a document satisfies the foundation requirements, the court may exclude
it if the sources of the information or the method or circumstances of its preparation
indicate a lack of trustworthiness. In short, under the Model Act it appears that the court
must admit a document that satisfies the foundation requirements and leave it to the trier
offact to consider the affect of all other circumstances, whereas under 803(6) all other
such circumstances are considered by the court in determining admissibility. See
Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669, 679 (1990). Even under the Model Act, however,
"a showing of unreliability may be so complete as to overcome the presumption ofverity,
and in such a case the trial judge should exclude the record." Thomas v. Hogan, 308
F.2d 355, 361 (4th Cir. 1962).
14. ALA. R. EvID. 803(6); ALASKA R. EvID. 803(6); Am. R. EvID. 803(6); ARK.
R. EvID. 803(6); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 (West 1997); COLOR. EVID. 803(6); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-180 (1997); DEL. R. EVID. 803(6); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-3-14 (1997); HAw. R. EVID. 803(b)(6); IDAHO CODE § 9-414 (1997);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-5 (West 1998); IND. R. EVID. 803(6); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60460(m) (1996); KY. R. EVID. 803(6); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 803(6) (West 1997); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS &JUD. PROC. § 10-101 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 78 (1997);
ME. R. EVID. 803(6); MICH. R. EvID. 803(6); MINN. R. EVID. 803(a); MIss. R. EVID.
803(6); MONT. R. EVID. 803(6), N.C. R. EVID. 803(6); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01
(1995); N.H. R. EVID. 803(6); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518 (McKinney 1992); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 27-803(5) (1997); NEv. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (1997); N.J. R. EvID. 803(c)(6); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 11-803(F) (Michie 1998); OHIO R. EviD. 803(6); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
2803(6) (1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 404A60(6) (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 (1997);
P.R. R. EVID. 65(F); RI. R. EVID. 803(6); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5-510 (Law Co-op
1997); TENN. R. EVID. 803(6); TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 803(6); UTAHR. EvID. 803(6); VT. R.
EvID. 803(6); WASH. REv. CODE § 5.45.020 (West 1997); W. VA. R. EVID. 803(6); Wis.
STAT. § 908.03(6) (1997); WYo. R. EVID. 803(6).
15. Thirty-seven (37) states have a business records rule patterned on 803(6).
Fifteen (15) states-Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming-adopted 803(6) verbatim; eighteen (18) states-Alaska,
Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and
Tennessee-adopted 803(6) with some modification, and four (4) states-Hawaii,
Nebraska, Nevada, and Wisconsin-adopted the Supreme Court's draft text verbatim or
with some modification. See infra note 41.
Seven (7) states-California, Idaho, Kansas, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Washington-have a business records rule patterned on the UBRE; five
(5) states--Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York-and the
District of Columbia have a business records rule patterned on the Model Act.
Virginia has a non-codified business records exception. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Phelps, 389 S.E.2d 454, 457 (Va. 1990); "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. v. Coley &
Petersen, Inc., 250 S.E.2d 765, 773 (Va. 1979).
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Different formulations of the business records exception do not necessarily
produce different results.' 6 As a practical matter, a judge who believes a
particular business document to be trustworthy and favors admitting business
records may do so without serious concern for reversal by basically ignoring any
language that might otherwise pose an impediment to admissibility. 7 The
chances of reversal are quite small because the trial court has broad discretion
on such evidentiary rulings.' In many cases, even if the appellate court finds an
abuse of discretion, it usually concludes that the error was harmless. 9
The following chart sets forth relevant portions of the business records
exceptions contained in 803(6), the Model Act, and the UBRIE.

16. See Thomas F. Green, Jr., The Model and Uniform Statutes Relating to
Business Entries as Evidence, 31 TULANE L. REV. 49, 54, 65-66 (1956); Gerald J.
Norville, The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 27 ORE. L. REV. 188, 189
(1948); Commentary, Revised Business Entry Statutes: Theory and Practice, 48

COL.L.REv. 920, 922 n.15 (1948).
17. See, e.g., Falcon Jet Corp. v. King Enter. Inc., 678 F.2d 73, 77 (8th Cir. 1982)
(stating that trial court has discretion to admit evidence under 803(6) if it finds "it to be
sufficiently trustworthy;" court admitted invoices that business received from other
entities for supplies and services); Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp. v. Goldman, 665 F.2d 43,
46 (2d Cir. 1981) (concluding that debtors' financial statements submitted to a bank
"satisfied the primary requirements" of 803(6) where testimony established that they
"were on the Bank's own form, were completed at its request, and were of a type
regularly used by the Bank in making decisions whether or not to extend credit").
However, the Second Circuit in Ollag did not delineate the "primary requirements" to
which it referred, but plainly they were not those of 803(6)). See also infra note 181 and
accompanying text.
18. There are also many cases which approve the admission of documents under
the business records rule with little or no explanation. See, e.g., United States v. Metallo,
908 F.2d 795, 799 (1 th Cir. 1990); Higgins v. Martin Marietta Corp., 752 F.2d 492, 497
(10th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a letter written by plaintiff's treating physician relating
to cause of plaintiffs respiratory problems was admissible because "[a]pparently this
kind of correspondence is regularly kept in the course of this physician's business");
United States v. Colyer, 571 F.2d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 1978).
19. See United States v. Williams, 109 F.3d 502, 507-08 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating
that any error to admit hotel records under 803(6) was harmless); United States v.
Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1414
(3d Cir. 1994); Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding
harmless error to admit memorandum for its hearsay purpose); Wilson v. Zapata Off
Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260,272 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that any error in admitting hospital
record was harmless).
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803 (6)20
A memorandum, record or
data compilation, in any form
of act, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time

Model Act
Any writing or record.., made
as a memorandum or record
of any act, transaction,
occurrence or event
shall be admissible in evidence
in proof of said act, transaction,
occurrence or event,
if the trial judge shall find

by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with
knowledge,
if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business
activity, and
if it was the regular practice of
that business to make the
memorandum, report, record or
data compilation,
... unless the source of
information or the method or
circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness.

that it was made in the regular
course of any business, and
that it was the regular course of
such business to make such
memorandum or record at the
time of such act, transaction,
occurrence or event or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
All other circumstances of the
making of the record including
lack of personal knowledge by
the entrant or maker, may be
shown to affect its weight, but
... not ... its admissibility.

UBRE
A record
of an act, condition or event
shall, in so far as relevant, be
competent evidence
if the custodian or other
qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its
preparation, and
if it was made in the regular
course of business,
at or near the time of the act,
condition or event, and

if, in the opinion of the Court,
the sources of information,
method and time of preparation
were such as to justify its
admission.

On its face, any version of the business records exception seems relatively
simple to apply. 803(6) is a good example. Apart from the foundation
requirements of timely preparation and personal knowledge by the individual
transmitting the information, the party offering into evidence a memorandum or
record of an event must establish: (i) that the memorandum or record was made
in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and (ii) that it was the
regular practice of that business to make the memorandum or record. For
example, assume that a bank officer wrote a memorandum memorializing a
meeting she attended to explore the possibility of a loan to X. Subsequently, in
a suit against X in federal court, the bank wishes to offer the memorandum into

20. FED. R. EvID. 803(6). This Rule begins: "The following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule..."
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evidence through the bank records' custodian. The bank's attorney would ask
the custodian 2' four questions using the rule's conclusory language:
I show you a memorandum dated January 4, 1999 that has been
marked as Exhibit 1 for identification. Was this memorandum,
Exhibit 1, made in the course of the bank's regularly conducted
business activity?
Was it the regular practice of the bank to make the
memorandum?
Was the memorandum made at or near the time of the meeting?

21. Under 803(6) and other business records codifications, the foundation
requirements may be established "by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness." FED. R. EviD. 803(6). The phrase "other qualified witness" has been broadly
interpreted. See United States v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that
foundation witness need not have personal knowledge of document preparation);
National Tea Co. v. Tyler Refrigeration Co., 339 N.W. 2d 59, 61 (Minn. 1983) (stating
that foundation witness "need not be an employee of the entity so long as he understands
the system"). In place of a foundation witness, a party often obtains a stipulation from
the opposing party, particularly when the business records are those of the opposing party
or a non-party. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 832-33 (11th Cir.
1996); United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir. 1989); Cooper Sportswear
Manuf. Co. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D.N.J. 1993). If an
opposing party refuses to stipulate, the proponent should consider serving requests for
admissions during the pre-trial discovery stage, as suggested in Romano v. United Parcel
Serv. Gen. Servs. Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19364, AT *3 (D. Or. 1996). See also

Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. v. Adams, 828 F. Supp. 379, 389 (D.S.C. 1993).
Some states have adopted Rule 902(11) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which
allows the proponent to satisfy the foundation requirements by submitting the custodian's
sworn written statement certifying, in conclusory terms, the existence of each condition
for admissibility under the business records exception. See, e.g., ALAsKA R. EVID.
902(11); Ky. R. EvID. 902(11); MD. R. EVID. 5-902(a)(I 1); TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 902(10).
Some states permit this procedure only for certain categories of documents. See, e.g.,
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 52.320-.375 (Michie 1997) (hospital records); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518(c)
(McKinney 1992) (hospital records); and §§ 4518(b)-(e) (records: regarding
DNA/Genetic Marker Testing).
Federal law allows admission of foreign business records in criminal proceedings
based on a custodian's written declaration. 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1994). See United States
v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975,
1030-34 (D.N.J. 1994); United States v. Gleave, 786 F. Supp. 258, 276-80 (W.D.N.Y.
1992), rev'd on other groundssub nom. United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir.
1994). Although the statute requires that a party intending to offer a document in
evidence under its provisions must give written notice to the other party, it has been held

that timely compliance with the notice requirement is not a pre-condition to admissibility.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3505(b); United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 177 (5th Cir. 1998).
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Was the memorandum made from information supplied by a
person who had personal knowledge of what transpired at the
meeting?
Most likely, opposing counsel would not object to these questions, the
custodian would answer "yes" to each of them, and the memorandum would be
received in evidence.22 But suppose opposing counsel objects to the form of the
question concerning the bank's "regular practice" as calling for a conclusion.
Or, suppose that during voir dire, opposing counsel probes whether it was the
bank's regular practice to make this type of memorandum. What factual
showing must the proponent of the memorandum then make in order to establish
that it was the regular practice of the business activity to make the
memorandum? Unfortunately, no definitive answer can be given to this question
because it is difficult to find a clear common thread in or to reconcile all of the
decisions that discuss or apply the regular practice requirement. Indeed, it is rare
to find a case that meaningfully analyzes the regular practice requirement, and
even more difficult to find one that gives trial courts and practitioners clear
direction.
This Article addresses this question and certain other aspects of the business
records exception that need clarification and utilizes 803(6) as the central focus
of the discussion. After a brief discussion of whether codifications other than
803(6) have a regular practice requirement, this Article will explore the
requirement's meaning and scope. The discussion will touch upon the interplay
and overlap between the regular practice requirement and the requirement that
the record be made in the regular course of business. Next, this Article will
examine the extent to which the exception requires that the declarant (the person
who supplied the information to the entrant) act under a duty to report. It will
explore situations where the declarant and the entrant are employees of different
companies or where the declarant is under a contractual but not a business duty
to supply information to the entrant. Then, the admissibility of a variety of

documents will be considered, including (i)documents produced from Company
R's files but which it received from Company S, and (ii) reports, audits, or other
documents prepared for businesses by independent firms such as appraisers,
accountants, and engineers. Finally, the issue of whether documents that satisfy
the business records exception to the hearsay rule must also satisfy all other
evidentiary rules, particularly the rules governing expert opinions, will be
considered.
As we shall see, courts are rarely careful or analytical when dealing with the
business records exception. They seem to gloss over difficulties that would arise
from a more faithful application of the exception's requirements and intuitively
admit documents they deem trustworthy. They do not appear hampered by

22. James W. McElhaney, On Admissibility, 83 A.B.A. J. 76 (1997). See Cobb v.
State, 585 N.E.2d 40,42 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding witness's conclusory answers

to counsel's foundation questions sufficient to satisfy foundation elements).
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particular codified language. As a result, courts have injected a degree of
confusion into an area that should be relatively clear. To eliminate this
confusion, courts should not only spell out the criteria that must be met in order
to satisfy each foundation requirement, but they should be more analytical and
precise in applying them, particularly where R offers in evidence documents
received from S. This clarification is necessary to give the business records
exception as codified its full effect, and to provide litigants a sounder basis on
which to predict the admissibility of their proffered evidence.

II. REGULAR PRACTICE REQUIREMENT
A. Basis ofRequirement
Each codified version of the business records exception expressly
conditions admissibility on a showing that the document was made in the regular
course of business at or near the time of the matter recorded.' Only 803(6) and
18 U.S.C. §350524 expressly spell out an additional requirement-that it was the
regular practice of the business to make the document. At first blush, this
requirement would appear to be distinct from the requirement that the record be
made in the course of a regularly conducted business activity. But that is not
necessarily so. The requirement that the document be made in the regular course
of business or in the course of a regularly conducted business activity may itself
encompass a regular practice requirement.
As written, the Model Act contains no express equivalent to 803(6)'s
regular practice requirement. 5 The Weinstein & Berger treatise ("Weinstein")
notes that the Federal Business Records Act ("Section 1732"),26 803(6)'s
predecessor, required a showing that it was the business's regular course to make
the memorandum or record.27 Although Weinstein's reading of the statutory
language is questionable,28 state courts that have adopted the Model Act have

23. See supra note 14.

24. The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3505 is derived from 803(6), and Congress
intended that it should be interpreted the same as 803(6) is interpreted. See H. R. REP.
No. 98-907 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3581-82.
25. See supra note 4; infra note 28.
26. Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1732, reprintedin U.S. Code Cong. Ser. A104 (1948).

Section 1732(a) is [virtually] identical to the Model Act. Comparethe Model Act, supra
note 4, with § 1732.
27. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WE1NSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
803(6)[03], at 803-204 (1996) ("[A virtually identical requirement] [to 803(6)'s regular
practice requirement] had been contained in the Federal Business Records Act").
28. In support of its position, Weinstein states that Section 1732 provided that "if
the judge shall find that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was
the regular course of business to make such memorandum or record." Id. 803(6)[3],
at 803-204 n.1. A careful reading of the full text, however, reveals that there is no
express statement in Section 1732 that the business have a regular course of making such
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similarly indicated that it has two requirements of regularity: (1) that the
memorandum be made in the regular course of any business, and (2) that it be
the regular course of business to make the memorandum.29 They apparently read
the Model Act, as Weinstein does, by divorcing the phrase "regular course of
business" to make such a memorandum or record from the phrase "at the time
of such act.. ." which immediately follows.3 I would suggest instead that a
regular practice requirement is encompassed within the statutory phrase "made
in the regular course of any business" or its equivalent.31 For one can plausibly
argue that a document should not be considered as having been "made in the

regular course of business" if it is not the regular course of the business to make
the memorandum.

In sum, business records statutes that do not include an express regular
practice requirement have been treated as if they contained such a requirement.
Regularity of record making, therefore, is an integral part of the business records
exception, regardless of the precise statutory language.

a memorandum, as Weinstein's truncated version would indicate. The full relevant text
states that "if the judge shall find that it was made in the regular course of any business,

and that it was the regular course of business to make such memorandum or record at the
time of such act.., or within a reasonabletime thereafter." Id. (emphasis added).

Weinstein's quote omits the italicized phrase which changes the meaning of the portion
that Weinstein quotes. Thus, the language after the word "and" did not expressly impose
an additional requirement that the business have a regular practice of making the
memorandum or record. Rather it merely allowed the proponent to prove the timeliness
of an entry by introducing evidence that the business had a regularpractice of timely
preparationin lieu of testimony that the entry was timely made. In short, as the Ninth
Circuit said, the above quoted relevant text expressly spells out "[t]he requirement that
the procedure call for timely entry of such records." Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d
188, 215 n.34 (9th Cir. 1957) (emphasis added).
29. People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501, 505 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4518(a) has two regularity requirements "first, that the record be made in
the regular course of business.., and second that it be the regular course of business to
make the record") (citing Cent. Fabricators Inc. v. Dutchman, 247 N.W.2d 804, 806
(Mich. 1976)). These courts do not explain how they reached their conclusions.
30. New York's statute, but not the Model Act, has a comma after the phrase
"regular course of any business to make the memorandum" and before the words "at the
time of such transaction." See also United States v. Delgado, 459 F.2d 471,472 n.5 (2d

Cir. 1972). The House Committee on the Judiciary also read Section 1732 to mean "that

it must have been the regular practice of a business to make the record." H.R. REP. NO.
93-650, at 14 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 2087-88.
31. See Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 215 (9th Cir. 1957); Scanlon v.

Hartman, 579 P.2d 851, 854 (Or. 1978) (holding that "[t]he phrase 'regular course of
business' [in the UBRE] means the record must be made regularly in addition to being
incident to a business").
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B. Congress'sInsertion ofRegularPracticeRequirement in the
Supreme Court'sDraft of 803(6)
This Article's discussion of 803(6)'s regular practice requirement will be
overlaid by a discussion of Weinstein's view, relied on by some courts, that the
absence of routineness, without more, is insufficient to exclude a business record
under 803(6).32 This view is built on the stated premise that "[n]umerous courts
had stated in dicta that the [Federal Business Records] Act required... that it
was the regular course of business to make that particular type of record," but
that "[a] reading of the cases indicates that this second factor was not usually
stressed. 33 According to Weinstein, courts "customarily admitted" records
"made in the course of the business without regard to whether the particular type
of record was routinely made." 34 From this premise, Weinstein argues that
"[s]ince Congress did not intend to make the business records exception [under
803(6)] more restrictive than it had previously been [under Section 1732]," it
follows that "Rule 803(6) has been correctly interpreted so that the absence of
'routineness' without more is not sufficiently significant to require exclusion of
35
the record.,

32. WEINSTEIN, supranote 27, 803(6)[03], at 803-204. WEINSTEIN expresses this
view more fully as follows:
Numerous courts had stated in dicta that the Act required not only that the
record be made in the ordinary course of business, but also that it was the
regular course of business to make that particular type of record. A reading
of the cases indicates that this second factor was not usually stressed.
Records were customarily admitted if made in the course of the business
without regard to whether the particular type of record was routinely made,
except when the court was concerned with the trustworthiness of the record.
Then, as in the leading case of Palmer v. Hoffman, the court might say that
the record was not 'typical of entries made systematically or as a matter of
routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect transactions with others, or
to provide internal controls.' Since Congress did not intend to make the
business record exception more restrictive than it had previously been, Rule
803(6) has been correctly interpreted so that the absence of 'routineness'
without more is not sufficiently significant to require exclusion of the record.
Nonroutine records made in the course of a regularly conducted 'business'
should be admissible if they meet the other requirements of Rule 803(6)
unless 'the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.' This latter condition operates not as a blanket exclusion but
only when the facts of the case indicate unreliability. A contention without
more that records of that type were not regularly kept should not suffice to
overcome admissibility.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 803(6)[3], at 803-204.
33. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 803(6)[3], at

34. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27,
35. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27,

803-204.
803(6)[3], at 803-204.
803(6)[3], at 803-204.
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Weinstein's view, however, should be discounted. To begin with, it is
based on an erroneous premise. Weinstein cites but two cases-UnitedStates
v. Hyde36 and United States v. Moran37 -to support his argument that records
were admitted under Section 1732 "if made in the regular course of business
38
without regard to whether the particular type of record was routinely made.
But neither case discusses the question of whether a document must be routinely
made in order to be admissible under Section 1732, 39 nor does either opinion
even hint that the document's admissibility was challenged on the ground that
the proponent failed to show that it was the business's regular course to make the
record. In addition, Weinstein failed to cite cases under Section 1732
emphasizing routineness or the regular course of business factor.4"
More importantly, Weinstein does not credit the expressed intent of
Congress or the specific language of 803(6). Even if the courts did not enforce
the regular course of business factor under Section 1732, as Weinstein asserts,
Congress made it clear that it wanted that factor stressed when it deliberately
added the regular practice requirement to 803(6). In 1973, the United States
Supreme Court submitted a draft of 803(6) to Congress ("Supreme Court text"),

36. 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971).
37. 151 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1945).
38. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 803(6)[3], at 803-204.
39. In Moran, the trial court admitted a memorandum of a telephone conversation
prepared by a bank employee. Moran, 151 F.2d at 662. The only objection raised was
that the bank memorandum was similar to the engineer's report of an accident in Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). Id. The Second Circuit in Moran rejected this
contention, pointing out that, unlike the report in Palmer,the memorandum "is a routine
record made for the bank's business as such and with no motivation to prepare for
litigation." Id. at 662. Moreover, if anything, Hyde undercuts Weinstein's point. In
Hyde, the maker of the written notes offered in evidence testified "that he regularly kept
informal notes of transactions on note cards in such situations," which he turned over to
another company officer for safekeeping. Hyde, 448 F.2d at 846. The maker had
routinely made informal notes of certain transactions. Id.
40. See Hanley v. United States, 416 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that
"the trustworthiness of the records arises because of their being created in the ordinary
course of business affairs, as routine recurring entries to identify routine transactions");
Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that Section 1732
required not only that slides were made in the course of the hospital's business, but also
that it was the regular course of the hospital's business to make them; evidence
established that both aspects were satisfied); Sabatino v. Curtis Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632,
637 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that "[r]ecords must be kept pursuant to some routine
procedure designed to assure their accuracy"); Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188,
215 (9th Cir. 1957) ("A memorandum or record cannot be considered as having been
made in the 'regular course' of business, within the meaning of § 1732, unless it was
made pursuant to established company procedures for the systematic or routine and
timely making and preserving of company records."); Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 89 (2d
Cir. 1956).
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which did not include the regular practice requirement.4' The House Judiciary
Committee, however, concluded that the regular practice requirement was a
"necessary further assurance of [the record's] trustworthiness. 42 It therefore
amended the Supreme Court's text and inserted the express language now found
in 803(6) requiring the proponent to show that the record was made pursuant to
"a regular practice of the business activity.'" 3 The Senate Conference Report left
the House Judiciary Committee's regular practice amendment intact 44 and
Congress adopted 803(6) with the House Committee's amendment. Thus, the
regular practice requirement added by Congress is no less a condition of
admissibility under the plain language of 803(6) than the requirement that the
record be made in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.
Further, the Advisory Committee's Note to the Supreme Court's text, which
was available to Congress, states that existing statutes and rules had a tendency
to unduly emphasize routineness and repetitiveness.45 Congress clearly voted in
favor of continuing to emphasize routineness and repetitiveness by including the
regular practice requirement in 803(6) with knowledge of the Advisory
Committee's statement. While, as Weinstein says, Congress may not have
intended to make 803(6) more restrictive than Section 1732, it is certainly true
that Congress did not intend to make it less restrictive than the existing law.
Simply put, had Congress intended the law to be as Weinstein asserts, it would
have left the Supreme Court text intact.46

41. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183
(1972); S. RE-P. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7052. The
Supreme Court text reads as follows:

(6)Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by,
a person with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted activity,
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
56 F.R.D. at 300-01.
42. Report on Federal Rules of Evidence, Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP
No. 93-650, at 14 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7087-88.
43. Id.

44. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report did not mention the House
Committee's proposed regular practice amendment although it disagreed with the House
Committee's addition of the word "business" before the word "activity." S. REP. No. 931277, at 27 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 7051, 7063. The Conference Report
adopted the House version of 803(6) "that the records must be those of a regularly
conducted 'business' activity." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 11 (1974), reprinted

in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7104.
45. 56 F.R.D. 183, 307 advisory committee's note.

46. One other point should be kept in mind. Courts and commentators gloss over
the fact that the Advisory Committee's Note to 803(6) does not discuss or even mention
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C. Meaning and Scope ofRegular PracticeRequirement
The notion of drafting a business record exception to the hearsay rule that
would be trouble free in its application is wishful thinking. No doubt those who
inserted the regular practice requirement in 803(6) believed that its meaning was
quite clear and that the limitation it imposed on admissibility would be easily
comprehended. In fact, few practitioners ask what this requirement entails.
Experience shows that if an employee has made a memorandum of a particular
event, the employee will most likely automatically answer "yes" if asked at a
deposition or trial whether it was his or the business's regular practice to make
such a memorandum. It would be most unusual for a lawyer to object to the
form of the question or for the witness to ask, "What do you mean by 'regular'?"
But what if a witness did ask the question? What answer should a lawyer
give her? Should a lawyer focus on frequency and answer that the word
"regular" means consistent, habitual, normal, usual, customary, or periodic? If
he did so answer, the witness would probably be more confused because these
definitions do not necessarily connote the same degree of frequency. Perhaps
the attorney should focus on the business's record-making procedure and
respond that the word "regular" means an action conforming to an established
procedure. This definition would not be satisfactory unless the witness was also

told whose established procedure isrelevant-the business's, the witness's, or
both. Suppose the business did not have an established procedure but the
witness invariably memorialized the type of event recorded. Or, suppose the
business had a fixed procedure for recording a certain type of event but the

the regular practice requirement. 56 F.R.D. at 307-11. The Note was prepared as a
commentary to a text that did not include an express regular practice requirement.
However, even after Congress added the regular practice requirement as a necessary
further assurance of trustworthiness, the Advisory Committee did not change its Note to
mention, much less discuss, Congress's action and its implications. Whether the
Advisory Committee deliberately failed to do so, its failure to refer to the regular practice
requirement should further limit the Note's usefulness as a guide to the proper
interpretation of 803(6) as enacted.
It appears that after Congress enacted 803(6), the Federal Judicial Center caused a
compilation to be prepared which contained, among other things, "the original Advisory
Committee Note (with such deletions as are required by any amendment made by
Congress to the rule)." The compilation was prepared "at the request of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. Professor Edward W. Cleary, who was the Reporter to the Advisory Committee
on Rules of Evidence, prepared the compilation, and it has been reviewed by Judge
Albert B. Maris, the former Chairman of the Standing Committee; Judge Roszel C.
Thomsen, the present Chairman of the Standing Committee; Judge Charles W. Joiner,
who was a member of the Advisory Committee and is now a member of the Standing
Committee; and Richard M. Mischke, a member of the staff of the Center." See Federal

Rules of Evidence Annotated, Foreword (Mathew Bender 1975).
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witness recorded such an event only on this one occasion. Should the witness
answer "yes" in both cases or only one, or should the witness answer "no" unless
both she and the business had an established procedure?
There is no packaged answer that the deposing attorney can give a witness.
Everyone would agree that the words "regular practice . . . to make the

memorandum" certainly include a repetitive practice pursuant to an established
company procedure to invariably record a particular event each time the event
occurs. But if the memorandum was not invariably made or was not made
pursuant to an established company procedure, no clear answer can be given
based on precedent because no clear definition of "regular practice" exists.
For example, in In re JapaneseElectronicProductsAntitrust Litigation,47

the Third Circuit rejected the district court's holding that the regular practice
provision requires the proponent to show that the records were "created by
routine practices where careful checking and habits of precision and regularity
assure their accuracy."4' The court did not believe that 803(6) requires a court
to independently analyze a business's record-making procedures, stating that
"[t]he principal indice of reliability is that reliance on routine record keeping is
essential to ongoing business activity."49 It further noted that the opposing party
may point out any record-keeping "deficiencies to show that the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."5 The Third
Circuit concluded:
Given the separate treatment in Rule 803(6) of untrustworthiness, we
think the regular practice requirement should be generously construed
to favor admission. Thus, for example, it may well be that a record of
a single meeting satisfied the regular practice requirement if the
business in question routinely records other important meetings.5'
The court's heavy emphasis on 803(6)'s separate treatment of lack of
trustworthiness seems misplaced. Establishing that the business has a regular
practice is an independent condition to admissibility under 803(6), and it is the
proponent's burden to establish that the condition has been met. If the proponent
does not satisfy the regular practice requirement, the court, without reaching
803(6)'s separate treatment of untrustworthiness, which the opponent must
prove, should not admit the document. In other words, only if the proponent has
established that the business had a regular practice of making the document must

47. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on othergrounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
48. Id. at 288-89.

49. Id. at 289. Actual reliance, however, is not a condition of admissibility. See
FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
50. JapaneseElectronic,723 F.2d at 289.
51. Id.
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the opponent go forward with its burden of showing a lack of trustworthiness if
it wishes to have the document excluded. 2
In the final analysis, the Third Circuit does not define the phrase "regular
practice." The court tells us only that the regular practice requirement "should
be generously construed in favor of admission," and, by way of example, says
that a record of a single meeting may satisfy the regular practice requirement if
the business "routinely records other important meetings." 53 The court's single
example, however, provides little guidance. The only point that emerges
somewhat clearly from Japanese Electronic is that a certain degree of
repetitiveness, some frequency of recording by the business, is required to satisfy
the regular practice requirement. 4 Whatever other parameters might be gleaned
or extrapolated from the single example leads only to more unanswered
questions such as:
Would the regular practice requirement be met where the employee
did not record other important meetings but the business routinely
recorded other important meetings?

52. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 289 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'don othergrounds,475 U.S. 574 (1986). The JapaneseElectronic court
makes this very point only a few pages later, albeit in a different context. Id. at 291. The
Court stated:
The circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness for Rule 803(6) is regular
recording of regular business activity. The trustworthiness proviso [of
803(6)] assumes that this guarantee is satisfied, and places on the opponent
the burden of overcoming that badge of reliability by showing other reasons
for untrustworthiness.
Id.
The Third Circuit's statement that 803(6) does not require a court to "independently
analyze the procedures used.., in making regularly kept records of regularly conducted
business" is also problematic. Id. at 289. Under 803(6), the proponent must produce
evidence to satisfy the regularity requirements. If the proponent produces such evidence,
the court must analyze it to determine whether those requirements have been met. This
is precisely what the Third Circuit did in making its determination as to the admissibility
under 803(6) of certain diaries, internal memoranda, and minutes of trade group
meetings. Id. at 289-98.
53. Id. at 289.
54. The JapaneseElectronic court considered the admissibility under 803(6) of
specific documents including diaries, internal memoranda, and minutes of trade group
meetings. Id. at 289-98. Its discussion of their admissibility does not shed much light
on its view of the regular practice requirement. At times the court split on whether the
evidence established a regular practice as to certain documents. Id. at 293, 296. Of some
significance is its holding that a memorandum by an employee of defendant Mitsubishi
Electric reporting on a meeting of a TV council was not admissible under 803(6) because
"[w]hat is missing.., in the record.., is anything suggesting the regularity of Melco's
[Mitsubishi's] practices with regard to recording what transpired at the meetings of the
Council." Id. at 298.
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Would the requirement be met if the employee routinely recorded
important meetings but the business did not routinely record them?
For a court to find that the business routinely records other important
meetings, must the proponent show that all other employees routinely
recorded important meetings?
Does the word "routinely" as used by the Third Circuit mean
"invariably," as it seems from the context?
The Second Circuit's effort in UnitedStates v. Freidin55 does little to clarify
the meaning of "regular practice." In Freidin, a Touche Ross client paid
defendant, a Touche Ross partner, an additional $22,000 fee for serving on its
advisory board; defendant deposited the fee in his checking account and, in turn,
gave Touche Ross a personal check from the same amount. The day Touche
Ross received defendant's check, the manager of its partners' affairs office was
away and Colasanti, the controller's secretary, who on occasion worked for the
partners' affairs office,56 was on duty. Colasanti prepared an intraoffice memo
to the manager stating, in part:57
Dick Freidin of New York Office gave me his check for 22m*
8M = Rollover Capital
14M = Capital Loan
He would like his full April distribution.
*gave to Parabatie [assistant to the manager].
The Government accused Freidin of failing to report this $22,000 as income and
offered the Colasanti intraoffice memorandum in evidence to dispute his claim
that Touche Ross had reported it. Based on testimony that only partners'
secretaries prepared any memoranda giving instructions on how to allocate
partners' funds among three types of capital accounts and that it was not
Colasanti's or-her supervisor's common practice to prepare any interoffice
communication concerning receipt of partners' checks,58 the Second Circuit
emphasized that it "must respect Congress's addition of the [regular practice
requirement] phrase."59 The court concluded that the Colasanti memorandum,

55. 849 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1988).
56. "On such occasions, Colasanti would keep track of the cash coming in for daily
borrowings or investing and would be told the amounts collected and the total of any
checks issued on a given day." Id. at 718.
57. Id.
58. Apart from Colasanti's secretarial duties of typing, filing, answering the phone,
and taking messages, "her only routine responsibilities" were accumulating information
daily on the amount of money the national office received and disbursed. Id. at 720.
59. Id. at 723. See also Yankee Bank for Fin. & Say. v. Task Assocs., Inc., 139
B.R. 71, 79 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992). Freidinis perhaps the only circuit court that has
given effect to Congress's inclusion of the regular practice requirement.
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which it characterized as an "isolated document," ' was inadmissible because it
was "not
shown to have been made pursuant to a 'regular practice' of Touche
6 1
ROSS."

Would the Japanese Electronic court have decided the Freidin case the
same way? Perhaps not. In Freidin,Touche Ross routinely made memoranda

that reflected the instructions given on how to allocate partners' funds; Colasanti

made such a memorandum on the single occasion in question.62 Japanese
Electronic, as noted, instructs that the regular practice requirement may be
satisfied when an employee [here Colasanti] makes a memorandum of a single
important meeting,here an instruction] if the business [here Touche Ross]
regularly memorializes other important meetings.63 Superficially, it seems that
JapaneseElectronicand Freidinare not compatible. I say superficially because
whether Japanese Electronic and Freidin are incompatible depends on the
resolution of questions that were not addressed in either of these opinions.
Japanese Electronic, for instance, is silent on whether the memorandum or
record must be prepared as part of the employee's regular duties, as Freidin
required. And Freidin leaves unanswered whether "regular practice" requires
some degree of frequency of recording by the employee. Stated differently,
Freidinis unclear whether it would have characterized the memorandum as an
"isolated document" or, consistent with Japanese Electronic, found that the
memorandum satisfied the regular practice requirement, in the event that
Colasanti had made the memorandum as part of her duties, even though she
never made another such memorandum.
One difficulty with Freidin is that Colasanti had a regular practice of
recording messages; thus, in recording the information she received from
Freidin, Colasanti was doing what she regularly did-recording a message. The
Second Circuit does not explain why the content of the subject matter recorded,
rather than the regularity of recording information generally, should determine
whether the regular practice requirement is satisfied. Implicit from its holding
is that "regular practice" means a practice within the scope of the employee's
duties; the Colasanti memorandum did not meet this standard because the
recording of partners' allocation instructions was part of the duties of partners'
secretaries only.

60. United States v. Freidin, 849 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 723. The government did not invoke the catchall provision, FED. R. EVID.
807 (formerly FED. R. EVID. 803(24)). The Colasanti memorandum was a perfect
candidate for admission under 807 because it had many indicia of trustworthiness and
was critical to the government's case. Id. at 722 n.4, 723.
62. Id. at 722.
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. In fact, the lower court in Freidin
stated that it was "clear" that it was Touche Ross's regular practice to make the
memorandum because records had to be kept of capital account contributions. United
States v. Freidin, 1987 WL 9442, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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In those jurisdictions which have adopted the Supreme Court text of
803(6), 4 which, as noted, does not contain an express regular practice
requirement, 5 Freidin would probably be decided no differently 66 because
another way of approaching the Freidin scenario is to ask whether the Colasanti
memo was made in the course of a regularly conducted activity,67 instead of
asking whether it satisfied the regular practice requirement. The facts establish
that Colasanti was acting beyond the scope of her duties in making the
memorandum; thus, it may be concluded that she (and thus the business) was not
acting "in the course of a regularly conducted activity. ' 68 Taking the latter
approach, such a memorandum may be excluded under any version of the
business records exception because all versions require a showing that the
memorandum was prepared in the regular course of business.
Zenith, as noted, requires a showing of some degree of frequency of
recording by the business to satisfy the regular practice requirement. However,
implicit in the court's statement that the recording of a single meeting satisfies
69
the requirement (if the business "routinely records other important meetings")
is that the requirement is met even if the maker exercises his or her judgment to
decide whether the meeting was an "important" meeting that should be
memorialized. Since Zenith, several courts have held that the regular practice
requirement was met even in instances where the maker exercised judgment
about whether an event should be recorded7" without discussing whether the

64. See supranote 15.
65. See supranote 41.
66. This is true even assuming that these jurisdictions would not interpret their text,
more specifically the phrase "in the course of a regularly conducted activity," to include
such a requirement. There is precedent for interpreting such a phrase to include both
regularity requirements. See Standard Oil v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 215 (9th Cir. 1957)
(decided under Section 1732); infra note 112-13 and accompanying text. However, in
light of the fact that the Supreme Court text was intended to downplay routineness and
repetitiveness, it is not likely that these jurisdictions would interpret the text in this
manner and thus make the text the equivalent of Congress's version of 803(6).
67. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 173 and accompanying text

69. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70. See United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir 1992) (discussed infra
note 71 and accompanying text); Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1989);
United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussed infra note 92 and
accompanying text); Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 1984 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
91,801(N.D. Ohio 1984). In Levinson, the court concluded that the records were "kept
in the course of a regularly conducted business activity" but made no reference to the
regular practice requirement. The court admitted (i) a memo where executive's "normal
practice" was to prepare a written record "if something of significance happened" and (ii)
a "memory crutch chronology" that the executive maintained "for significant corporate
developments" but excluded a board member's memorandum described by him as
"sketch list of notes" of a telephone conversation with another board member.
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business routinely records other important events. However, it is fair to say that
none of these later decisions gives significant additional guidance.
For example, in United States v. Jacoby,1 the Eleventh Circuit rejected an
interpretation of 803(6) that would exclude business records not routinely made.
In Jacoby, defendant objected to the admission under 803(6) of a closing
memorandum of loan transactions prepared by Scheer, an associate in a law firm.
In the memo, Scheer stated that he had closed the loans at his client Jacoby's
direction after advising Jacoby of many document deficiencies and other
problems with the loans.72 Scheer did not make a memorandum of every
closing. Rather, the court noted, he dictated memoranda to the file "whenever
something about a transaction needed to be explained or noted." 73 The Eleventh
Circuit held the memorandum admissible under 803(6), concluding that "the
routineness or repetitiveness with which a record is prepared is not the
touchstone of admissibility" under 803(6). 74 Thus, the court considered the
regular practice requirement satisfied, even though Scheer only frequently (not
invariably) prepared memoranda to the file as part of his regular business activity
of closing loans, and even though he only made them whenever he "believed it
necessary to explain something or make a record of an unusual circumstance. ' 75
Unfortunately the Jacoby court neither discusses nor indicates that it was
aware of the legislative history of the regular practice requirement. Instead of
making an independent analysis of 803(6), the court relied on Weinstein's view
that "the absence of routineness without more is not sufficiently significant to
require exclusion of the record, 76 a view which, as previously explained, 7
should not be given much credit. To be sure, the court stated that "we are guided
by the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(6). "78 The Note to which the
court refers, however, is the Advisory Committee's Note to the Supreme Court's
text of 803(6), 79 not the Note to the text of 803(6) as enacted by Congress. The

71. 955 F.2d 1527 (1lth Cir. 1992).

72. Id. at 1537.
73. Id. at 1536. A real estate paralegal in the law firm testified that more than
occasionally Scheer would prepare memoranda; that it was his habit to prepare a memo
to the file if something had to be explained. Id.
74. Id. at 1537. The court, however, does not explain what is the "touchstone of
admissibility."
75. United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1992).
76. Id.
77. See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
78. Jacoby, 955 F.2d at 1537.
79. The portion of the Advisory Committee's Note that "guided" the Jacoby court
states:
The element of unusual reliability of business records is... supplied by...
actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an

accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation ....

The model

statutes and rules have sought to capture these factors and to extend their
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Note explains that the model statutes used the phrase "regular course of
business" in conjunction with a broad definition of "business." This resulted, the
Note states, in an undue emphasis on "a requirement of routineness and
repetitiveness and an insistence that other types of records be squeezed into the
fact pattern which give rise to traditional business records."8 Because of this,
the Note concludes that the Supreme Court text "adopts the phrase 'the course
of a regularly conducted acivity' as capturing the essential basis of the hearsay
exception... ,,, clearly implying that the Supreme Court text rejected the prior
undue emphasis on routineness and repetitiveness. However, since Congress did
not pass the Supreme Court's text to which the Note is addressed, but instead
added the word "business" to the phrase "the course of a regularly conducted
activity,"8 2 Jacoby'sreliance on the Note is misplaced. If the Note provides any
guidance, it is that Congress's rejection of the Supreme Court's text and its
insistence on the phrase "regularly conducted business activity" are indications
that Congress did not intend to change the tendency [of model statutes and rules]
to emphasize routineness and repetitiveness under 803(6).83

impact by employing the phrase "regular course of business," in conjunction
with a definition of "business" far broader than its ordinary accepted meaning.
The result is a tendency unduly to emphasize a requirement of routineness and
repetitiveness and an insistence that other types of records be squeezed into
the fact patterns which give rise to traditional business records. The rule
therefore adopts the phrase 'the course of a regularly conducted activity' as
capturing the essential basis of the hearsay exception ...
Id. at 1537-38 (citations omitted in original).
80. United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1537-38 (11 th cir. 1992).
81. Id.
82.' After Congress enacted 803(6), the Federal Judicial Center published the

original Advisory Committee's Note, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ANNOTATED 140
(Mathew Bender 1975), with the following sentence deleted:
The rule therefore adopts the phrase 'the course of a regularly conducted
activity' as capturing the essential basis of the hearsay exception as it has
evolved and the essential element which can be abstracted from the various
specifications of what is a 'business.'
FED. R. EVID. 803(6), advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 308 (1973).
However, it should be noted that the Advisory Committee's Notes published in the
United States Code are entitled "Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules;" that
is, the Notes to the Supreme Court's text of 803(6), and they contain this sentence. 28
U.S.C. app. at 898-99 (1994).
83. Leaving aside Jacoby's misplaced reliance on the Note, it is doubtful that the
relevant portion of Scheer's memorandum was made in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity. In memorializing his version of a conversation in which his
client allegedly instructed him to close a loan without proper documentation, Scheer
appears to have prepared the memorandum primarily to protect himself and his firm in
the event the client or a third party challenged his actions in closing the loan. It does not
appear to be a memorandum prepared for conducting the firm's primary business, which
is to represent clients (here, the closing of loans) or even its own internal business
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In any event, Jacoby does not explain satisfactorily how Scheer's practice
constitutes a "regular practice" and does not attempt to define the words "regular
practice." Scheer's actions in making memoranda do not seem to fit any of the
basic definitions of the word "regular"; his actions did not conform to a fixed
procedure or standard and they were not habitual or certain. The memorandum
in question was made only because Scheer believed it prudent to memorialize the
clients' instructions, not because he or the firm had an established procedure to
memorialize clients' instructions or to make closing memoranda.
The First Circuit's decision in Kassel v. Gannett Co. 84 also takes the
position that the regular practice requirement may be satisfied in cases where the
frequency of record-making depends on the maker's judgment. In Kassel, the
court approved the admission under 803(6) of VA forms that memorialized
telephone contacts with certain Senators' aides based on the maker's testimony
that he completed telephone contact forms only in those instances when he
perceived the need.85 Although the court noted that the failure to record every
phone call does not require exclusion and that "some degree of discontinuity or
selectivity remains permissible," it did so without explaining why the subjective
nature of the "practice" to record phone calls satisfied the rule's regular practice
condition.86 The court's allowance for some degree of discontinuity may be
understandable but it does not give any guiding criteria. Perhaps discontinuity
should not be fatal if, at the very least, the business has an established procedure
for recording certain events that on occasion is not followed. However, Kassel
does not indicate that the VA had a policy requiring employees to fill out a
form for each telephone conversation. Under such circumstances, there is no
compelling case to consider the telephone forms as having been made pursuant
to a "regular practice."
Other circuits that have considered the regular practice requirement have
not necessarily admitted documents made as a result of individual judgment. For
example, in United States v. Ramsey, 7 the Seventh Circuit excluded a desk
calendar on which Harvey, a businessman, had taken notes to keep track of his
telephone calls to SURE, a company which supposedly was arranging a large
loan for him.8 8 According to the court, entries made "at the whim of the writer[]
do not have the sort of regularity that supports a reliable inference."89 Harvey's
calendar notes were made because of "his desire to record his dealings with
SURE," not because he had a consistent pattern of making notes of other
operations.
84. 875 F.2d 935 (lst Cir. 1989).
85. Id. at 944.
86. Id. at 945. Accord United States v. Skeddle, 981 F. Supp. 1069, 1072-73
(D.N.D. 1997). Nor did Kassel discuss Congress's intefit in adding the regular practice
requirement.
87. 785 F.2d 184 (7th Cir 1986).
88. Id. at 192-93.

89. Id. at 192.
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telephone conversations." The Seventh Circuit therefore concluded that the
calendar notes were not made with the "regularity" that 803(6) contemplates. 91
Put somewhat differently, in Ramsey, the Seventh Circuit seems to interpret
803(6) as requiring a consistent pattern of entries, which is not present if the
maker's decision to record is ad hoc in nature. However, as in previously
examined cases, Ramsey fails to set out clear guiding principles.
In Ramsey, the Seventh Circuit was faced with its prior decision in United
States v. Hedman.92 In Hedman, a corporate employee who had been making
payoffs to building inspectors for several years voluntarily began recording the
payoffs in a notebook and continued to do so for nine years in order to give an
accounting to defendant's vice president if he ever demanded one.93 The court
held that the fact that the corporate employee "was not told to keep the diary and
did not make it available to others.., did not affect its admissibility under Rule
803(6)."" 4 The court noted that since the employee believed he would be
required to account, it was unlikely he would make false entries.95 Here, as in
Ramsey, the entries were prompted, to paraphrase Ramsey, by the employee's
desire to record his dealings with the building inspectors. The entries were
90. Id.
91. Id. at 192. The court fully explained:
Miscellaneous jottings should not be admitted under Rule 803(6) just
because they have some connection with a regular business. The idea
behind Rule 803(6) is that when a record is kept with sufficient
regularity, the existence of an entry (or the absence of one) is good
evidence that the thing in question took place (or did not take place).
Business records are reliable to the extent they are compiled consistently
and conscientiously. Occasional desk calendars, in which entries may
or may not appear at the whim of the writer, do not have the sort of
regularity that supports a reliable inference. This is not to say that desk
calendars never may be business records; they may, if they are
maintained regularly, without regard to the events subject to the trial,
and there is a demonstrable pattern of inclusion or exclusion. Harvey's
note-taking evidently was prompted by his desire to record his dealings
with SURE, however, and this is not the sort of regularity that allows a
court to treat the document as a business record.
Id. (citations omitted). Note that the Seventh Circuit used the word "regularity" and not
the phrase "regular practice" or "in the course of a regularly conducted business activity."
Its discussion might be applicable even if a statutory business records exception did not
have an express "regular practice" provision.
92. 630 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1980). The two cases were decided by two entirely
different panels.

93. Id. at 1197.
94. Id. at 1198.
95. Id. Perhaps, as the court asserts, the employee was not likely to falsify.
However, the employee had no incentive to be accurate. The employee had no risk ifhis
records were not accurate because the employer had no way of checking if all of the cash
payments were made and to whom they were made.
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made, as in Ramsey, at the employee's whim, and it was he who decided
whether to make the entry without any established business procedure. Indeed,
there is every reason to believe the business probably did not want any record of
the payoffs. As in Ramsey, there was no showing that the employee had a
consistent pattern of making notes of other business contacts or events. The only

difference between Hedman and Ramsey is that the employee in Hedman, who
decided keep records in the same manner as Harvey, maintained records longer
than Harvey. In any event, neither Ramsey nor Hedman provides workable
criteria for determining whether the regular practice requirement has been met.96
Apart from the regular practice requirement, it seems questionable, as in
Jacoby,97 that the corporate employee made the entries in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity. The payoff records suffer from the same
impediment as the protective memorandum in Jacoby. Here, too, the employee
probably made the payoff records to protect himself from any future accusation
that he pocketed the monies. Nothing indicates that he made the records to help
in the ongoing conduct of his employer's business or because the company
wanted a record of such transactions. There was no evidence that he informed
anyone at the company that he was maintaining payoff records or that the
employer relied or would rely in any way on them.

Neither Jacoby, Kassel, nor Hedman cited Smith v. Bear,98 which the
Second Circuit decided under Section 1732. In Smith, plaintiff offered in
evidence three memoranda prepared by Gill, a bank official, of events that
transpired at luncheon meetings Gill attended. The foundation witness testified
that Gill had no duty to make such memoranda, that he decided when to make
the memoranda depending upon the importance of the incident, and that he
might write a memorandum at a time other than when the incident occurred. 99

Recognizing that Section 1732 was intended to bring business practice realities
into the courtroom and that the statute should not be interpreted in a "dryly
96. Ramsey also distinguished United States v. McPartlin,595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.
1979). In McPartlin,the court admitted an executive's "desk calendar-appointment diary

in which he noted "anticipated meetings, telephone calls, personnel matters and [job]
bids." 1d. at 1347. The court stated that these records "were kept as part of a business
activity and the entries were made with regularity at or near the time of the described
event." Id. They also satisfied, in the court's view, "the central rationale" of 803(6)
because the executive had to rely on these entries, which he used, for example, to prepare
letters or memoranda or to recall a bid. Id. The court did not indicate whether the
executive recorded all anticipated meetings, bids and phone calls or whether he did so
only when he believed that it was important to do so. As to the lack of a company policy
to maintain such records, the court said that even if they were not mandated by company
policy, they "were kept in accord with the widespread practice of business executives to
maintain such records." Id. at 1348. See United States v. Skeddle, 981 F. Supp. 1069,
1072-73 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
97. See supra note 71.

98. 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956).
99. Id. at 89.

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 64

technical way," the Second Circuit nevertheless concluded that the foundation
testimony did not establish that "the memoranda were made in the regular course
of business":'
The test of admissibility of memoranda covered by the business entry
rule is the 'regularity' of the business practice in making such a
record. This is the standard fixed by the Supreme Court when it said
that the basis for the rule is '[t]he probability of trustworthiness of
records because they were routine reflections of the day to day
operations of a business.' We believe [the] testimony did not establish
that degree of regularity which is required by the statute.' 0 1
Smith appears to teach us that where the entrant has discretion to decide
when and if a memorandum should be prepared, the "made in the regular course
of any business" requirement is not satisfied. Unlike Jacoby, Kessel, or
Hedman, Smith implicitly emphasizes routineness and established procedures or,
in short, "regularity," as the applicable standard. Yet, like the above-mentioned
cases, Smith is not very informative. It does not expressly define the statute's
regularity requirement, nor does it set forth specific guidelines to judge whether
a document satisfies the "degree of regularity" that the statute requires.'0 2

100. Id. The court acknowledged that "a responsible corporate officer such as Gill
might well deem it advisable 'in regular course of any business' to make notes of
transactions at such [luncheon] meetings." Id. Smith seems to treat the "made in the
regular course of any business" requirement as including a regular practice component.
101. Smith, 237 F.2d at 89 (citations omitted).
102. Many cases have considered the admissibility, under 803(6) and other
business record exceptions, of a variety of memoranda, notes, and reports of events, but
virtually none have defined regular practice or regular course of business or given clear
guidance as to its meaning. See, e.g., Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 101
(2d Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's written notation that wire transfer it received was
for payment where it was shown that there was a "regular practice to get information
from the person who created the document"); Hoselton v. Metz Baking Co., 48 F.3d
1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that an accountant's notes concerning the
negotiation of an agreement were admissible under 803(6) to prove that certain
statements were made at a conference where he was acting as client's accountant and
consultant in transaction and where it was his practice to take notes of meetings which
he initialed, dated, and filed were business records); United States v. Goodchild, 25 F.3d
55, 61-62 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that memos of telephone conversations made by credit
card company's collections department were admissible under 803(6) because they were
made in the course of a regularly conducted activity-telephone investigations of
delinquent accounts-and it was standard procedure to have all phone calls "memoed");
Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a report documenting
prisoner's physical movements that contradicted his paralysis claim were made in regular
course of prison's business because authorities had valid interest in determining whether
prisoner's claim was legitimate; no regular practice issues were raised); United States v.
Leo, 941 F.2d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1991) (admitting, without explanation, summaries
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Strong support for an approach that emphasizes repetitiveness-and rejects
individual discretion-may be derived from Rule 803(7),'03 which provides that

containing conclusions from an audit of firm's subcontracting costs made by finance
executive after question arose as to the propriety of such costs; executive testified that
audit's goal was to discover truth and the firm refunded millions of dollars to government
based on audit); United States v. Goins, 593 F.2d 88, 91 (8th Cir. 1979) (admitting
memorandum prepared by tavern operator, with daughter's assistance, listing bribe
payments to defendant from proceeds of the tavern's operation); Gibbs v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that an insurance company's
interdepartment memorandum quoting an independent investigator working for the
company that insurer would have settled within the policy limits was admissible under
803(6) in an action for bad faith failure to settle where testimony showed that company

had a regular practice of preparing and circulating memoranda relating to a claim); Hiram
Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Meditation Soc'y, 501 F.2d 550, 554 (1st Cir. 1974)
(holding that tables of adjustment of numbers of guests prepared by resort owner based
on room checks by maintenance employees were inadmissible under Section 1732
because the room checks were "hardly the kind of regular systematic business activity
which is encompassed by the exception"); Pritchard v. MacNeal Hosp., 960 F. Supp.
1321, 1325 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding supervisors' memoranda of employee's
performance problems admissible under 803(6) because company had regular practice
of using supervisory evaluations to document employee performance); In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group Inc., 160 B.R. 729, 734 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (admitting,
without discussion of regular practice issue raised by employee, interoffice memo
written by Drexel's New York personnel administrator to Drexel's Tokyo office manager
reciting separation terms of Tokyo employee as reported by employee's supervisor);
Holmes v. State, 671 N.E. 2d 841, 858 (Ind. 1996) (holding that a restaurant's night shift
manager's handwritten message for day manager was made as part of her routine duties
to inform next shift of relevant event occurring on her watch and describing serious
discord between defendant who had been fired, and an employee admissible under 803(6)
in prosecution of defendant for death of the employee); People v. Perfetto, 518 N.Y.S.
2d 662, 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (admitting, under New York's Model Act, night
watchman's report prepared a few days after a murder, offered as evidence that defendant
was on plant premises on morning of murder, in murder prosecution where it was shown
that night watchman was required to file reports of "unusual" occurrences with his
superiors); Ruegg v. Fairfield Sec. Corp., 308 N.Y. 313, 322-23 (N.Y. 1955) (admitting
"as made in the regular course of business" memorandum by attorney's secretary
reporting on a telephone call from client to attorney's office); Sullivan v. Carpenter, 199
P.2d 655, 658 (Or. 1948) (holding that a list of materials used on paint job admissible
under UBRE as record made in regular course of business because it consisted of a series
of entries regularly made in relation to plaintiff's business and was not a casual or
isolated entry); Crane v. State, 786 S.W.2d 338, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (holding
that a transcript of tape recordings of some of defendant's telephone calls while
incarcerated not admissible under 803(6) because, among other things, most calls were
recorded under a discretionary policy and, thus, transcript was apparently not a regularly
conducted activity).
103. FED. R. EVID. 803(7). This rule provides:
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports,
records, or data compilations in any form, kept in accordance with the
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the absence of an entry in a record kept in accordance with 803(6) may be used
to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter if a record of the matter
was "regularly made and preserved."' 4 It seems evident in this context, where
a proponent wants to use the record to prove a negative-that an event did not
occur-that the word "regularly" does not mean in the entrant's judgment, or
sometimes, or frequently, or even usually. °5 Rather it must mean habitually or
invariably. Only if a business has a practice of making a record each time a
certain event occurs can one logically infer that the event did not occur when the
business's records contain no entry of such an event.
Furthermore, because Rule 803(7) expressly incorporates the provisions of
803(6), a proponent who wishes to invoke 803(7) to prove the nonoccurrence of
a matter must show that the business records were "kept" in accordance with
Rule 803(6).'06 Thus, the proponent must establish that it was the business's
regular practice to record the type of event. Again, in this context, the words
"regular practice" must mean habitually or invariably. The incorporation of
803(6) into Rule 803(7) strongly supports an interpretation of the regular practice
requirement in 803(6) that is consistent with the interpretation of Rule 803(7).07
Apart from 803(7), strong support for defining "regular practice" to mean
essentially habitual or invariable may also be found in cases decided under the
Model Act. In People v. Kennedy,' the Court of Appeals interpreted New

provisions of [803(6)], to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of
the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.

104. Id.
105. Cf Anrstead v. United States Dept. of H.U.D., 815 F.2d 278, 282 n.3 (3d Cir.
1987) (implying that the words "regular practice" are not synonymous with "usual
practice").
106. To make sense in the context of 803(7), the word "kept" must mean "made"
and "kept," not merely "retained." Congress added the phrase "kept in accordance with
the provisions of [803(6)]" to the Supreme Court's draft text of Rule 803(7), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7088. The phrase, however, seems redundant in light of the
explicit provision at the end of 803(7), which reads: "[I]f the matter was of a kind of
which a memorandum... was regularly made and preserved."
107. See United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 192 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that
"the idea behind Rule 803(6) is that when a record is kept with sufficient regularity, the
existence of an entry (or the absence of one) is good evidence that the thing in question
took place (or did not take place)"). Of course, given the different focus of each rule,
courts might feel at liberty to apply them differently, being more lenient in applying the
"regular practice" requirement for 803(6) purposes; that is, allowing for some lapses in
following established procedures or frequency than for purposes of 803(7). Nonetheless,
since the same language, in essence, appears in both, it makes sense that they should
basically have the same meaning.

108. 503 N.E.2d. 501(N.Y. 1986).
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York's version of the Model Act"° as containing a "double requirement of
regularity: (1) that the records be made in the regular course of business"0 and
(2) that it be the regular course of business to make the record.""' The second
requirement seems to be the equivalent of 803(6)'s phrase "regular practice."
However, in contrast to Freidin,Zenith, andJacoby,Kennedy explicitly defined
the "regular course of business to make a record" requirement as meaning
"essentially that the record be made pursuant to established procedures for the
' 12
routine, habitual, systematic making of such a record.""
Kennedy did not refer to the earlier Ninth Circuit decision in StandardOil
Co. v. Moore,"3 which interpreted Section 1732 similarly albeit using a different
route. In StandardOil, the Ninth Circuit defined the statutory phrase "made in
the regular course of any business" using virtually the same language that
Kennedy did in defining the statutory requirement that it be the "regular course
of such business" to make the document. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a
document is "made in the regular course of any business" within the meaning of
Section 1732 if"it [is] made pursuant to established company procedures for the4
systematic or routine and timely making and preserving of company records.""1
109. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518(a) (McKinney 1992).
110. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d at 508-09. It defined the "made in the regular course
of business" requirement to mean that the record "reflects a routine, regularly conducted
business activity... needed and relied on in the performance of functions of the
business." Id. at 509.
111. Id. at 507-08.
112. Id.
113. 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1958).
114. Id. at 215. Note that New York added the word "habitual" between the words
"systematic" and "routine" after reversing their order. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text. See also Continental Bakery Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137,
148 (6th Cir. 1960) (holding that written reports were admissible as having been made
in regular course of business because Continental had an "established policy" for depot
managers to report on competitors field activities).
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the proponent had not established an adequate
foundation for the admission of the typical day-to-day intra-company memoranda that
businesses chum out. It observed that the absence of an established procedure for the
systematic routine and timely making and preserving of company records was "selfevident" because:
They were patently intended as communications between employees, and not
as records of company activity. Many of them were casual and informal in
nature, seeking or providing information of a kind which could be, and no
doubt often was, communicated by telephone or in conference. Most of them
were apparently written as a result of the exercise of individual judgment and
discretion.
StandardOil, 251 F.2d at 215. The court hastened to say that "informal memoranda,
prepared for the purposes of recording company acts ... would be admissible." Id. at
223 n.35.
The Ninth Circuit has continued the StandardOil approach under 803(6). See,
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Given that Congress specifically added the regular practice requirement to
the Supreme Court's draft text and that a similar requirement is found in 803(7),
it would be reasonable to define "regular practice" to mean "essentially that the
record be made pursuant to established procedures for the routine, habitual,
systematic making of such record.""' 5 Even under this definition, courts no
doubt would differ in applying the rule to given situations. Some courts might
stretch the criteria for admissibility to cover cases in the grey area,"16 and there
will always be cases that test the outer limits of the definition. For the most part,
application of this definition should not limit, at least in federal courts, the
general admissibility of trustworthy documents. To be sure, it will limit their
admissibility under 803(6). But, for the most part, business records should be

e.g., City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 46 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 1995) (no
showing that notes were made pursuant to company procedures and relied upon by
company); Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int'l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 450 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 1983); Clark v. City of Los
Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1981). In Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450, the Ninth
Circuit, without citing its StandardOil decision, concluded that an E-mail transmission
from an employee to his superior is not admissible under 803(6) because such messages
are not made in the course of regularly conducted business activity. It distinguished its
decision in United States v. Catabran,836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1988), which admitted
computer printouts of bookkeeping records entered into the computer monthly, stating:
The difference between Catabranand the present case is that E-mail is far
less of a systematic business activity than a monthly inventory printout. Email is an ongoing electronic message and retrieval system whereas an
electronic inventory recording system is a regular, systematic function of
bookkeeping prepared in the course of business.
Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450. The Third Circuit, however, refused to adopt the Standard
Oil approach under 803(6), at least to the extent that StandardOil requires the proponent
to show an established procedure. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also
Scanlon v. Hartman, 579 P.2d 851, 854 (1978) (discussing the UBRE, the court said that
"[t]he phrase 'regular course of business' means the records must be made regularly in
addition to being incident to a business").
115. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d at 507-08.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a drug dealer's ledger in which she entered "most of her large drug transactions" was
admissible under 803(6) against one of defendant; fact that dealer did not record every
sale and that the ledger was an incomplete record of that defendant's drug dealing did not
alter accuracy of other entries); United States v. Skeddle, 981 F. Supp. 1069, 1072-73
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that although accounting firm had no formal policy requiring
note taking at client meetings, employees customarily took notes when they wanted to
have a record for future reference; court admitted certain notes stating that the note taking
"was a regular, although not universally followed, business practice").
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admissible under Rule 807,17 803(1),"' or some other hearsay exception,119
depending on the circumstances.
To some degree, the regular practice requirement overlaps with the other
regularity requirement-that the record be made in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity or in the regular course of business. As seen,
Kennedy defined "regular practice" in virtually the same terms as StandardOil
defined "made in the regular course of business." Indeed, the same facts may
2
establish that a document does not meet either of the regularity requirements.1 1

117. FED. R. EvID. 807. This rule, commonly known as the residual exception or
catchall provision, provides:

A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the
hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
declarant.
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 392-94 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
bank personnel's computer record of credit cardholder's oral statements not admissible
under 803(6) to prove the truth of the statements, but admissible under the residual
exception); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1127 (1st Cir. 1989); Karme v.
Comm'r, 673 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding foreign bank's records not
admissible under 803(6) because witness not qualified to lay proper foundation, admitted
under catchall provision); United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 516 F. Supp.
1237, 1240-42 (D.D.C. 1981). A proponent must be diligent to comply with the residual
exception's notice provision or risk forfeiting the right to rely on it. See, e.g., United
States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 1992).
118. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). This rule provides that "[a] statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter" will not be excluded even though the declarant is
available as a witness. See, e.g., United States v. Kehoe, 562 F.2d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 1977);
United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass. 1997) (E-mail message
inadmissible under 803(6) admitted under 803(1)).
119. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (recorded recollection); United States v.
Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1986); Good v. A.B. Chauce Co., 565 P.2d 217,
222 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); see also State v. Ross, 714 P.2d 703, 705-06 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that statements on 911 tape recording not admissible under business
records exception admissible as excited utterances).
120. See State v. Perniciaro, 374 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (La. 1979) (applying a
restrictive formulation of the common law business records exception, court excluded
records that "were not kept and checked with a degree of habit, system, regularity and
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Except for Kennedy, virtually no case separately and specifically defines
both of these requirements. There are, of course, cases that define "made in
regular course of any business" in some manner.'2 1 Basically, these definitions
2
are based on the Supreme Court's statements in Palmer v. Hoffman.
According to Palmer,a document is "made in the regular course of business" if
it is the type of document that is "made systematically or as a matter of routine
to record events or occurrences, to reflect transactions with others, or to provide
internal controls."'" This definition does not include records of events or
occurrences that have "little or nothing to do with the management or operation
of the business as such," even if the business has established procedures for
recording such events and occurrences.12 As the Supreme Court said, only
business records which are "routine reflections of the day-to-day operations of
a business" are presumed to be trustworthy." s Thus, the phrase "regular course
of business" must find its meaning in the inherent nature of the business in

question and in the methods
systematically employed for the conduct of the
126
business as a business.

From Palmer,it would appear that the business records exception should
only cover events that are not unusual or outside the daily business routine. As
Kennedy said, "made in the regular course of business" means "essentially that

continuity which would prevent casual inaccuracies and counteract the possible
temptation to misstatements"); infra note 129 and accompanying text. Cases might not
make clear whether they are speaking of both or only one of the regularity requirements.
See Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Meditation Soc'y, 501 F.2d 550, 554 (1st Cir.
1974) (stating that "a crucial aspect of the business records exception is that entries be
prepared as a regular part of the business"); infra note 128 and accompanying text.
121. See Koppinger v. Cullen Schiltz & Assocs., 513 F.2d 901, 907 (8th Cir.
1975); Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767, 772 n.19, (D.C. Cir. 1969); Thomas v.
Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 358 (4th Cir. 1962) (stating that "to the extent that a record
describes a usual routine operation of business, it is considered trustworthy. But outside
the area of such usual business routine, no presumption of verity attaches.") (citing
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111-15 (1943)); State v. Garlick, 545 A.2d 27, 32
(Md. 1988); Williams v. Alexander, 129 N.E.2d 417, 418-19 (N.Y. 1955).

122. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
123. Id. at 113.
124. Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Act applies to regular course of
business and not to regular course of conduct which may have some relationship to
business. Id.
125. Id. at 113-14.
126. Id. at 115. Palmer's definition incorporates elements which others may
include as part of the "regular practice" requirement, such as routineness or systematic
recording. Kennedy, on the other hand, defined "made in the regular course of business"
solely in terms of the nature of the business activity-essentially that the record "reflect
a routine regularly conducted business activity, and that it be needed and relied on in the
performance of functions of the business." People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501, 507

(N.Y. 1988).
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it reflects a routine, regularly conducted business activity and that it be needed
'
and relied on in the performance of functions of the business."127
Records of
isolated or unusual events, therefore, may be excluded because by definition they
are not "made in the regular course of business." Such records may also be
excluded on the ground that they do not satisfy the regular practice
requirement. 28 Thus, a document that records an unusual or isolated event may
arguably be excluded because either (i) the event did not occur in the course of
a regularly conducted business activity or (ii) the regular practice requirement
is not satisfied.'29

127. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d at 508-09. See Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4th
Cir. 1962); Crowder v. Aurora Coop. Elevator Co., 393 N.W.2d 250, 258 (Neb. 1986)
(holding that "the activity recorded must be a type which regularly occurs in the course
of the business's day-to-day activity"). But see Birch v. Township of Drummer, 487
N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that record made in response to act which
never previously occurred may be admissible if made in the regular course of business);
Newark Elects. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 264 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)
(admitting under Illinois Model Act, water damage calculation over objection that it was
not made in the regular course of business because it was not the business of the entity
whose property was damaged to prepare such compilation-computation). InNelvark the
Illinois appeals court rejected the concept that the recording of an isolated event cannot
satisfy the business record exception. The court explained:
[I]n our opinion, prior, regular floodings are not a precondition for the
admission of a compilation-computation of a business's first experience with
a disaster in order to make such admissible within the confines of Rule 236.
Being in business-any kind-demands records for the routine day-by-day
transactions, but regular, in our opinion, need not be day-by-day as to
transactions or events that do not occur and have not occurred. A given
event, transaction, or occurrence may occur only once and simply because it
has never happened before it is not a contradiction to say that in making a
record of such event, transaction or occurrence, singular though it may be, it
was not made in the regular course of business.
Id.

128. See John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 588 F.2d 24, 31
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a list of customers that plaintiff allegedly lost to defendant
as a result of defendant's pricing policy "presents a close question of admissibility"
because the "list [was] compiled under the special circumstances of [defendant's] price
cut rather than a record kept as a 'regular practice' of the plaintiff s business").
129. Unless the court, in excluding a document, discussed each foundation
requirement separately, it may be difficult to determine on which ground the document
was excluded. See O'Malley v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 776 F.2d 494, 500
n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that an engineer's report on the causes of mudslides
inadmissible because evidence did not establish that the engineering firm regularly wrote
reports on the causes of mudslides); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1350-51
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding inadmissible memoranda detailing history of contracts
company awarded because the company did not have a regular practice to make such
memoranda) (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)). Practically speaking, it
should make no difference which theory a court uses, except perhaps in a jurisdiction
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A blanket rule that a document recording an isolated or unusual event is not
admissible under 803(6) would appear quite extreme. At times, a business
routinely records events that transpire during the course of business without
differentiating between usual and unusual occurrences. For example, a night
business manager may record all events of which the business's day manager
should be aware, or a secretary may record all messages even if the message is
unusual. 30 In such cases, the frequency with which the event occurs should not
be controlling. In other words, a document should be not be excluded simply
because the document records unusual or isolated events if such events are
recorded in the usual routine of the business. As in all situations, a court should
consider each foundation requirement separately to determine whether the
document satisfies all of the requirements.
An examination of two other hypothetical situations proves helpful.
Suppose that a laboratory performs a test that it has never performed before and
records the results pursuant to the laboratory's established procedure for the
systematic, routine, and habitual recording of all lab tests. Is the lab test record
admissible under the business records exception? Or, suppose an appraisal firm
which regularly appraises industrial buildings is asked to appraise an office
building. Is the appraisal's company's written appraisal of the office building
admissible if the appraisal firm's established procedure is to prepare a written

report of every appraisal it performs? In other words, assuming that the
laboratory and appraisal firm have the necessary expertise to do the lab test or
the appraisal, should the lack of experience in performing the test or doing the
appraisal mean that either of the regularity requirements has not been met? 3' In
these two hypothetical situations, there is much to be said for the argument that
the lab test and appraisal report meet the regular practice requirement because
they were prepared pursuant to established procedures for recording the work
done by the lab and the appraisal firm. But do they meet the other regularity
requirement? It may be that until it can be said that the lab is in the business of
performing such a test and the appraisal firm is in the business of appraising
industrial buildings, the lab test record and the appraisal report would not satisfy
the regularity requirement of having been "made in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity." Yet, if the lab and appraisal firm have the
expertise but not the experience, it is arguable that such reports were "made in

which has no explicit "regular practice" requirement and which does not interpret the
phrase "made in the regular course of business" as including a regular practice
requirement.
130. See, e.g., Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 858 (Ind. 1996) (holding that
night manager's note to day manager describing personnel problems admissible because
note was prepared "as part of her routine duties to inform the next shift supervisor of
relevant events occurring under her supervision").
131. These reports, of course, might still be excluded under 803(6)'s "lack of
trustworthiness" provision.
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the regular course of business," if the respective organizations intended to
continue to do business in these areas.
The outer limits imposed by the business records exception's regularity
requirements cannot be precisely delineated. There will always be cases that do
not fall into any clear category and that test the outer limits of admissibility.
Some stretching of those limits may be necessary to cover cases that arguably are
in the gray area. Courts should be cautious, however, not to stretch those limits
and increase confusion in this area. Unlike 807's catchall provision, 32 the
business records exception has no advance notice provision.'
The need for
predictability is therefore all the more important. Certainly in those jurisdictions
that have a catchall provision such as 807, or have implemented a like provision
through case law,'34 there is no legitimate or compelling reason to stretch the
limits of the business records exception.
Finally, parties who want documents excluded must discover the facts
necessary to establish a lack of regularity during the pre-trial stage.'35 This is
particularly important in jurisdictions permitting admission of documents upon
written certification'36 because such certifications always use conclusory
language. Thus, if opponents desiring to exclude a document have appropriately

prepared themselves during the pre-trial stage, they will be ina position to make
a factual showing that the document does not satisfy the exception's foundation
requirements. Similarly, attorneys who are not hesitant to object at trial to
foundation questions seeking to elicit a conclusory answer will be prepared to
voir dire the foundation witness.
III. BUSINESS DUTY REQUIREMENT
A. Duty to Report
Most codifications of the business records exception do not explicitly
require a showing that the person who furnished the information (declarant) to
the entrant acted under a business duty to report; that is, acted in the regular

132. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807; see also supra note 103.
133. See supra note 12.

134. See, e.g., State v. Sharpe, 491 A.2d 345, 354 (Conn. 1985) (holding that
information in a business record which was furnished by a volunteer who had no duty
to report it admissible "because it contained sufficient indicia of reliability and
trustworthiness and because it was necessary to the resolution of the case"). Connecticut
codified the catchall provision in 1997. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-180 (1997).

135. Attorneys might be surprised by how unprepared deponents are to answer
questions concerning the regularity of their practice in making memoranda or other
records.
136. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID 902(11); KY. R. EvID. 902(11); MD. R. EVID. 5902(a)(1 1); TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 902(10).
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course of business. 137 The phrase "made in the regular course of any business,"
however, implicitly imposes such a requirement if it is interpreted to include not
only the entrant's actions but also those of the declarant. That is, "made" is
construed to cover the actions of all those whose participation is essential to
produce the written record. New York's landmark case of Johnson v. Lutz,
which has been widely followed, filled the void. 3 8 Johnson firmly established

137. This requirement is explicitly included in the Supreme Court's draft text of
803(6) and the version of the business records exception adopted in Alaska, ALASKA R.

EVID. 803(6) (information must be supplied by "a person with knowledge acquired of a
regularly conducted business activity"); Arizona, ARIz. R. EVID. 803(6) (information
supplied must be "acquired in the course of a regularly conducted activity"), Louisiana,
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 803(6) ("[tihis exception is inapplicable unless the recorded
information was furnished to the business either by a person who was routinely acting
for the business in reporting the information" or is otherwise not excluded by the hearsay
rule); and Tennessee, TENN. R. EVID. 803(6) (information must be supplied "by a person
with knowledge and a business duty to record or transmit"). See supra note 142.
138. Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517, 519 (N.Y. 1930) (holding that police accident
report of accident not admissible under New York's business records exception because
witnesses furnishing the information were not acting under a duty to furnish it). Accord
FED R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. at 308-09; Cameron v. Otto
Bock Orthopedic Indust., Inc., 43 F.3d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1994); Gray v. Busch

Entertainment Corp., 886 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Bortnovsky, 879
F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Pazsint, 703 F.2d 420, 424-25 (9th Cir.
1983); United States v. Burruss, 418 F.2d 677, 678-79 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1948); Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 416 P.2d
793, 800-801 (Cal. 1966); Thirsk v. Ethicon, 687 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983);
State v. Sharpe, 491 A.2d 345, 353 (Conn. 1985); Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d
1248, 1255 (D.C. 1986); Eichholz v. Pepo Petroleum Co., 475 So. 2d 1244, 1245-46
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1993);
Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 432 N.E.2d 474,478 (Mass. 1982); Sas v. Strelecki,
264 A.2d 247,250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (stating that declarant must be under
"business duty to supply honest information"); Fagan v. City of Newark, 188 A.2d 427,
439-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963); Synder v. Portland Traction Co., 187 P.2d 563,
566 (Or. 1947); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 885
(W.Va. 1992). But see Bondie v. Bic Corp., 947 F.2d 1531, 1534 (6th Cir. 1991);
Downing v. Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); State v.
Brunette, 501 A.2d 419, 426 (Me. 1985); Pencom Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 658 N.Y.S.2d
258, 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that a recruiter's notes of information provided
by job applicant concerning reasons for job change, job requirements, and the like,
admissible under C.P.L.R. 4518 because applicant's desire to secure better position, the
recruiter's reliance on the information, and applicant's awareness of that reliance "created
an equivalent business duty" on applicant's part to respond accurately to recruiter's
questions). None of these factors, however, seems to provide a logical basis for the New

York court's conclusion that a business duty was created. For example, how does an
applicant's desire for a better job point to creation of a business duty to the prospective
employer? The applicant is still nothing more than a prospective employee who would

be expected to act in her own interests.
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the principle that a memorandum or record is admissible under the business
records exception to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the document only
if the declarant was under a business duty to report the information; 139 that is, if

When Congress amended the Supreme Court text to add a regular practice
requirement, it deleted the phrase "in the course of a regularly conducted activity" and
substituted the phrase "if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,
and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum."
However, it does not appear that Congress intended to make any change other than to add
the regular practice requirement and the word "business" before the word "activity." See
VT. R. EVID. 803(6) reporter's notes (rejecting construing Congress's changes to
Supreme Court's text of 803(6) as eliminating the requirement of a business duty to
transmit). The Congressional Committee Reports neither mention the business duty
requirement nor do they indicate that Congress intended to reject it. Further, since 803(6)
as passed does contain the phrase "if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity," which is similar to the language in Section 1732, the drafters probably assumed
that the business duty requirement was encompassed within that phrase. The Advisory
Committee's Note to 803(6) is not very relevant to this issue; it addressed the Supreme
Court's text of 803(6), not the final version, and the Advisory Committee did not change
its Note after 803(6) was enacted. But see United States v. Reyes, 157 F.3d 949 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating that "the requirement of a business duty is not in the language of 803(6)
but it has long been recognized as the principal means of establishing the reliability of
a hearsay statement offered under the rule"); Bondie v. Bic Corp., 947 F.2d 1531, 1534
(6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "unlike some state rules... 803(6) does not require that the
declarant have a duty to supply the information").

Some courts admit documents under the business records exception without

focusing on, or by overlooking, the business duty issue. See, e.g., United States v. PentR-Books, Inc., 538 F.2d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 1976).
139. If the declarant was not under a duty to report, but the entrant was under a
business duty to record, then the memorandum or record may be admitted under the
business records exception, but only to prove that the declarant made the statement, not
to prove the truth of the declarant's statement, unless the declarant's statement satisfies
some other hearsay exception. A simple hypothetical will illustrate this point. Suppose
that A, an employee of X Co., made a memorandum which states that she was told by B
that two of X's factories were shut down for one day in 1997. If B were an employee of
X and had firsthand information, the memorandum would be admitted under the business
records exception to prove the truth of the matter that B asserted-that two of X's
factories were shut down for one day in 1997. If B were not an employee, but a
newspaper reporter, the memorandum would present a multiple hearsay problem. The
memorandum itself would still be admissible under the business records exception to
prove only that B, the newspaper reporter, made the statement, but not to prove the truth
of the matter asserted in the statement-that two of X's factories were shut down for one
day in 1997-unless the reporter's statement satisfied another exception. See United
States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d
957, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Burruss, 418 F.2d 677, 678 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding police report
admissible to show car reported stolen, but not to prove it was stolen); Thirsk v. Ethicon
Inc., 687 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding complaint forms admissible
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the declarant was acting in "the regular course of business."' 40 Put differently,
a document is not "made in the regular course of business" if the supplier of the
information to the entrant is an outsider, as distinguished from a person acting
under a business duty. 141 As the Advisory Committee's Note to 803(6) explains,
if the information supplier is not acting in the regular course of business, "an
essential link is broken," and the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the
information itself ....

to prove truth of the matter asserted if persons who transmitted information were acting
under a business duty to report; if not, forms admissible only to show complaints were
made); Merrow v. Bofferding, 581 N.W. 2d 696, 700-01 (Mich. 1998); Toll v. State, 299
N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). Needless to say, a business duty to report includes
the duty to supply honest information.
140. See United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 62 (7th Cir. 1971); Standard Oil Co.
v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 214 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863,
869 (2d Cir. 1948). As The Ninth Circuit said in StandardOil: "Where the information
comes to the entrant or maker from unauthorized persons, the memorandum or record is
therefore inadmissible, not because it contains hearsay, but because it was not made in
the regularcourse of business." StandardOil, 251 F.2d at 214 (emphasis added). See
also ALA. R. EVID. 803(6), advisory committee's note ("Rule 803(6) does require that
one transmitting information that another records in the regular course of business must
have 'knowledge' of the facts communicated .... Equally clear is the fact that the
person transmitting the information must be doing so in conformance with regular
business practice."); Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930); Snyder v. Portland
Traction Co., 185 P.2d 563, 566 (Or. 1947).
141. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
142. 56 F.R.D. at 308-09. More fully, the Note explains:
Sources of information presented no substantial problem with ordinary
business records. All participants, including the observer or participant
furnishing the information to be recorded, were acting routinely, under a duty
of accuracy, with employer reliance on the result, or in short "in the regular
course of business." If,however, the supplier of the information does not act
in the regular course, an essential link is broken; the assurance of accuracy
does not extend to the information itself, and the fact that it may be recorded
with scrupulous accuracy is of no avail. An illustration is the police report
incorporating information obtained from the bystander: the officer qualifies
as acting in the regular course but the informant does not. The leading case,
Johnson v. Lutz, ....
held that a report thus prepared was inadmissible. Most
of the authorities have agreed with this decision ....
Id. See also Johnson, 170 N.E. at 519 ("An important consideration leading to the
amendment [enacting the Model Act] was the fact that in the business world credit is
given to records made in the course of business by persons who are engaged in the
business upon information given by others engaged in the same business as part of their
duty.").
If a document is made pursuant to a duty imposed by law, is such a document made
in the regular course of business? Compare Mathews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409,
413-15 (5th Cir. 1954) (excluding such documents under Section 1732) and United
States v. Veytia-Bravo, 603 F.2d 1187, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979) (admitting such documents
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Courts have relaxed the business duty requirement in several instances, each
of which raises questions. To begin with, courts purport to relax the requirement
either: (1) where the business-entrant verified the information furnished by a
declarant who is not under a business duty, or (2) where other adequate
guarantees of trustworthiness exist."' Thus, for instance, a hotel registration
card will be admitted under 803(6) to prove the truth of the matter recorded; that
is, to prove the identity of the person registered, if the hotel employee verifies
the information "for example, by examining a credit card, driver's license, or

other form of identification."'"

Implicit is the assumption that the hearsay

under 803(6)) with Lewis v. Baker, 526 F.2d 470, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1975). The answer,
it seems, should depend on whether the business made the record solely for the purpose
of complying with a legal duty to make such records or whether the business also
intended to use it as a record of its business activities. If the business intended to use the
document in the same manner as it does any of its others business records, then it should
be admissible under the exception. If however, the document was made solely for
purposes of complying with a legal duty, it should not be deemed a record made in the
regular course of business. See Starkovich v. Noye, 529 P.2d 698, 704 (Ariz. 1974).
143. United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (company
required photo identification); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 403 (3d Cir.
1996); United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (questioning whether
verification procedures were sufficient to verify recipient's actual receipt but concluding
that any error was harmless); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that entrants had personal knowledge or made entry based on existing history
charts which themselves would be admissible business records); United States v.
Mcntryre, 997 F.2d 687, 700 (10th Cir. 1993) (admitting motel registration card where
identity of guest verified by examining driver's license); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d
123, 127 (9th Cir. 1992) (form identifying person as purchaser of gun); United States v.
Patrick, 959 F.2d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that 803(6) does not require that
declarant be under a business duty to provide accurate information; sufficient if
proponent shows that standard practice was to verify information or that information
satisfies another exception); United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 625 (7th Cir.1989)
(hotel guest registration record); United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir.
1980).
144. Lieberman, 637 F.2d at 101. See also United States v. McIntyre which would
include cases where there has been no verification, but other adequate guarantees of
trustworthiness exist. 997 F.2d at 687, 700. The court said:
[T]he fact that the name on the registration was obtained from an actor not
under a business compulsion does not necessarily mean the business records
exception is inapplicable. If the business entity has adequate verification or
other assurance of accuracy of the information provided by the outside
person, the exception may still apply. Some courts have required that the
business employee recording the information be 'able in some way to verify
the information provided-for example, by examining a credit card, driver's
license, or other form of identification.' We do not feel that in every case
there must be direct testimony that an employee actually verified the
information, nor is it necessary that there be an express policy that
identification be checked. In some cases, the interests of the business may be
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within hearsay problem'45 is solved by the verification procedure or some
additional guarantees of trustworthiness. None of the cases, however, explains
how these verification procedures or additional trustworthiness guarantees in fact
eliminate the multiple hearsay problem; indeed, it seems that in most cases they
do not eliminate it.
For analysis purposes, let us use the hotel guest registration card. To the
extent the guest furnished the information, the registration card should be
inadmissible because the guest was under no business duty, and thus the
registration card was not "made in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity." This leaves the verification procedures. The flaw in considering these
procedures sufficient for purposes of 803(6) is that 803(6) also requires that the
46
record be made "from information transmitted by a person with knowledge.'
When the entrant verifies the recorded information from a license or credit card,
however, the entrant's knowledge is plainly second-hand or hearsay and does not
satisfy the rule's personal knowledge requirement. 47 For the entrant knows only
what he was "told" by the license or credit card, which in turn is connected to the
guest only by the guest's implicit or explicit statement that the license or credit
card is his. Here too the guest's statements should not be considered sufficient
for purposes of the business records exception because, in vouching for the
license or credit card, the guest is not acting under a duty. In sum, courts should
not view the verification procedures as a substitute for the business duty
requirement; rather, such procedures must be tested in 803(6)'s personal
knowledge requirement. If they satisfy it, the documents should be admissible;
but if they do not, courts should exclude them and should not substitute other
criteria for those of 803(6).
It may be answered that the requirement of a business duty to report does
not spring from the express requirement that the document be made in the
regular course of business but is an independent court-imposed requirement to
further ensure the accuracy of the record.'48 If the rule is viewed in this manner,

such that there exists a sufficient self-interest in the accuracy of the log that
we can find its contents to be trustworthy. However, in the instant case we
do not find adequate guarantees of trustworthiness in the financial selfinterests of the motel. Moreover, there was no evidence either that the
identity of the individual claiming to be Vickie Hogg was actually checked
or that there was a policy to do so. Nor do we find it persuasive that a motel
employee transcribed the information rather than the guest.
Id. (citations omitted).
145. See supra note 139.
146. See supra note 12.

147. Unless the license, credit card, or other document used for verification
purposes is a self-authenticating document. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 902(1).
148. See United States v. Reyes, 157 F.3d 949 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The requirement
of a business duty is not in the language of 803(6), but it has long been recognized as the
principal means of establishing the reliability of a hearsay statement offered under the
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courts may relax their self-imposed requirement when the entrant verifies the
outsider's information, even if the verification is based on hearsay sources.
However, if the business duty rule is not encompassed within the language of
803(6), then the proponent should not have the burden of proving that the
business duty requirement or its equivalent is satisfied. For under 803(6), the
proponent only has the burden of proving the foundation requirements contained
in the rule. Put differently, there is no statutory basis to impose on the proponent
the additional burden of satisfying a business duty requirement unless it is an
inherent part of the "made in the regular course of any business" foundation
requirement. If it is not, that is, if the business duty requirement is imposed
independent of the exception's codified requirements, then it seems that the
burden should be on the opponent to show the lack of a business duty or its
equivalent as part of the opponent's burden under 803(6) to show a lack of
trustworthiness.
In any event, the business duty requirement should be viewed as inherent
in the "made in the regular course of any business" requirement, 49 not as a
requirement imposed in addition to the foundation requirements contained in the
codified language of the exception. Johnson v. Lutz makes this clear. 50 After
reviewing the history and purpose of the Model Act, the Johnson court
concluded that the business records exception was not intended to apply to a
memorandum made from information imparted by a person who was not acting
under a duty to report. 151 It therefore excluded a police report based on
information imparted by volunteers because-and this is the key---"[t]he
memorandum in question was not made in the regular course of any
In sum, the business duty requirement should be treated as
business ..
nothing less than an integral part of the "made in the regular course of any
business" requirement. Thus, a document prepared from information supplied
by a declarant not under a business duty should not be admissible because it does
not satisfy that regularity requirement.
White Industries, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 153 would relax the business
duty requirement where the outsider-declarant has a contractual duty to the
entrant to furnish the information. In White Industries,the plaintiff offered into
evidence forms that Cessna had initially prepared identifying each aircraft it
manufactured and leaving space for the distributors or dealers to fill in

rule."); Bondie v. Bic Corp., 947 F.2d 1531, 1534 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Unlike some state
rules of evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) does not require that the declarant
have a duty to supply the information .... ).
149. In States that have expressly included the business duty requirement in their
codifications of the exception, verification from outside sources should certainly not be
acceptable. See supranote 15.
150. Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517, 518 (N.Y. 1930); see also supra note 140.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 611. F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Mo. 1985).

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[V7ol. 64

information about the monthly status of each aircraft in their hands. The
distributors and dealers completed and returned the forms to Cessna pursuant to

a reporting obligation imposed by Cessna's standard contract with each of them.
54
Cessna used the completed forms for planning production schedules.
Defendant objected to their admissibility under 803(6) because the recorded
information allegedly came from an outside source.
Recognizing that "existing case law provides little real analytical guidance,"
the district court viewed the problem from a trustworthiness perspective. 55 It
distilled from the employer-employee and principal-agent relationship the factors
that it believed gave written business reports circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. 5 6 The court then analyzed the reporting duty arising out of an

ongoing contractual duty of one business to another to determine whether this
duty had "the same general indicia of trustworthiness" as found in the business
duty arising out of an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship.'

The

154. Id.

155. Id. at 1060
156. Id. at 1060-61. Noting that all hearsay exceptions are grounded in the concept

that they possess sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admissibility without
producing the declarant, the court listed the following factors which, it indicated, appear
to supply those guarantees in the context of written reports by an employee to employer
or by an agent to principal:
A business interest in obtaining the information on the employer or
principal's part, usually expressed by way of some custom, policy or directive
and reflected in the employer or principal's reliance on and use of the
information, coupled with steps (training programs, audits, etc.) to insure that
those requirements are accurately carried out;
(b) A corresponding duty on the employee or agent's part to collect and
record the information, accompanied by an element of potential detriment to
the employee or agent-as by discipline, failure of advancement, termination
of relationship, etc.-if the duty is breached; and
(c) The general trustworthiness which attends the fact that most employees
and agents are loyal and have an interest in reporting correct business
information to their employer or principal.
Id. at 1060.
157. Id. at 1061. The court felt that the same general indicia of trustworthiness as
found in the employee-employer relationship could be found in other contexts, stating
that:
These same general indicia of trustworthiness, it seems to me, can also be
found in some situations where the reporting duty arises by way of a
continuing business relationship between two independent business entities.
For example, a business entity's interest in receiving information can be quite
as easily found in a continuing contractual requirement for the same as in a
directive to employees, at least when the receiving entity customarily uses and
relies on that information. The counterpart element of compulsion and
potential sanction as concerns the reporting entity can likewise be found in a
continuing contractual requirement, if the requirement is sufficiently specific
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court then held that an ongoing relationship in which one business has a
"contractual duty to report" information to another possessed indicia of
or agent's business duty. It
trustworthiness equivalent to an employee's
58
therefore admitted Cessna's forms.
White Industries's focus on whether the contractual duty provided the same
general indicia of trustworthiness as an employee's business duty is misplaced.
Such an analysis would be appropriate if the relevant question were whether the
written records had equal guarantees of trustworthiness, which it would have

been had the records been offered under Rule 807. However, under 803(6), the
relevant question is: Are records "made in the regular course of business" within
the meaning of 803(6) if the declarant is an employee of an outsider with a
contractual duty to report to the entrant?

The Second Circuit in LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines5 9 went

further than White Industries in relaxing the business duty requirement. In
Sabena, the court admitted under Section 1732 a tape recording that an air
controller made as part of his regular air control procedures of a plane crew's

and if the nature of the information to be furnished is such as to suggest that
both entities would attach some significance to the requirement. The last
factor does present possible problems; and it is here that one must be
particularly careful. The interests of a business entity and its employees or
agents generally coincide in this context; those of two independent business
entities, even though a contractual or other business relationship exists
between them, may not or may do so only to a limited degree. It is that
relationship, and in particular the interests and motivation of the reporting
entity, which must be examined with special care.
Id. Any trustworthiness problem appearing in such a relationship, the court noted, could
be handled under 803(6)'s separate treatment of untrustworthiness. The court stated that
"any blanket rule of exclusion based solely upon a potential for difficulty in connection
with this last [third] factor would appear inappropriate." Id.
158. White Indust., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (W.D.
Mo. 1985). The court, and perhaps the parties, complicated a relatively simple matter.
The documents were probably admissible as the business records of the distributors or
dealers, as the case may be. The court mistakenly treated Cessna as the author and the
distributors and dealers as the declarants. However, Cessna was the author of only the
initial portion of the forms-the information identifying the aircraft and the distributor
to whom sold; it made no entries on the forms based on information supplied to it by the
distributors or dealers. It appears that each distributor filled in the forms with the
information it had and the dealers filled in the information they had. The distributors and
dealers were both entrants and declarants of their respective information. The proponent
therefore could have offered the documents as business records of the distributors, with
respect to the information they supplied, and the dealers with regard to the information
they supplied. Had the parties and the court focused on the true author of each portion
of the forms, there would have been no necessity for the court to consider extending the
business duty requirement. See also Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1255
(D.C. 1986).
159. 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
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statements to him concerning the plane's flight positions. The court held that
even if the crew members had no obligation to report, the Johnson v. Lutz
principle was inapplicable because the crew's regular business practice was to
make the report it did. Thus, the court noted, the crew's statements were "not
the gratuitous reports of persons not involved in the business.' ' 60 The court
concluded that the crew's reports "should be as reliable as the typical business
record."' 6' Here, too, the Second Circuit appeared to focus on the recording's
general reliability and apparently was not concerned that the declarants (the
crew) were not airport employees.
Fundamentally, the issue presented by White Industries and Sabena,but not
discussed by them, is one of statutory interpretation. Everyone would agree that
a document is "made in the course of a regularly conducted business activity"
and thus admissible under the business records exception to prove the truth of
the statements it contains if both the maker and declarant acted under a business
duty in the same business. Is the same true if the maker and declarant did not act
in the regular course of the same business but each acted under a duty to, or in
the regular course of, different businesses-the maker acting in the regular
course of business X and the declarant in the regular course of business Y? Put
another way, can a memorandum produced by a joint business activity, where
the entrant and declarant work for two different companies, be characterized as
having been made in the regular course of business for purposes of 803(6) or a
6
similar rule?1 1
The facts of Northeast Bank & Trust Co. v. Soley 163 are illustrative. In
NortheastBank, Bank A prepared a daily prime rate schedule based on the prime
rate that Bank B's employee reported to it in the regular course of his duties at
Bank B.164 Since the employees of Bank A and Bank B acted in the regular
course of their respective businesses, NortheastBank clearly presented the issue
of whether Bank A's record of Bank B's prime rate was a record produced "in
160. Id. at 273. See also United States v Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir.
1976) ("The common carriers who prepared the delivery receipts and transmitted them
to Goodyear did so in the regular chain of business activity and cannot be called "nonparticipants."); Schmutz v. Bolles, 800 P.2d 1307, 1313 (Colo. 1990) (holding reports
of drill malfunctions prepared by drill manufacturers from information supplied by
doctors and hospital personnel admissible under 803(6)); Great West Food Packers, Inc.
v. Longmont Foods Co., Inc., 636 P.2d 1331,1333 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Neither the
Sabena nor Baxtercourt discussed whether they considered the entrant and declarant as
acting in the regular course ofthe same business or as acting in the regular course of their
respective separatebusinesses.
161. Sabena, 344 F.2d at 273.

162. This question grew out of a conversation with my colleague Judge George C.
Pratt concerning the opinion he wrote in UnitedStates v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.
1992).
163. 481 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1984).
164. Id. at 1126. It was common practice for Boston banks to rely on Bank B's
floating prime rate. Id.
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the course of a regularly conducted business activity" within the meaning of
803(6). But, in admitting the schedule, Northeast Bank did not discuss the
issue. 65 Indeed, no court has squarely analyzed it. Comments in several cases
indicate that the business records exception applies only where the document

165. The court admitted the schedule, relying on cases which held that records
furnished by one business to another which are integrated into the latter's records and
relied on by it are admissible under 803(6). Id. at 1127. Even if this concept were
otherwise sound, Bank B did not furnish a record to Bank A; Bank B's employee only
orally reported to Bank A. In a subsequent decision, Leen Co. v. Web ElectricInc., 611
A.2d 83, 84 (Me. 1992), Maine's Supreme Court recognized that in NortheastBank it
admitted a document based on information from an outsider. Citing to its Northeast
Bank decision, the court stated that "in certain circumstances, business records may
include information prepared outside the business" provided the information contained
"indicia of reliability that form the basis of the business records exception." Id. at 83-84.
The court did not address the issue of business duty in this context; instead it apparently
relied on a general "indicia of reliability" test.
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was prepared by an entrant and a declarant employed by the same business.
For example in Johnson v. Lutz, the New York Court of Appeals said:

66

[A]n important consideration leading to the [enactment of New York's
business record exception] was the fact that in the business world
credit is given to records made in the course of business by persons
who are engaged in the business upon information given by others
engaged in the same business as part of their duty. 67

166. Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930); see also Snyder v. Whittaker
Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that 803(6) requires showing that
document was "prepared in the regular course of author's business"; the court, however,
was not faced with the situation discussed in the text and emphasis on the word
"author's" may be misplaced); State v. Winslow, 197 A.2d 778 (Conn. App. Ct. 1963)
(stating that "to be admissible the entry must be one based on entrant's own observation
or information of others whose duty is to transmit it to him, and those others must be
members of the organization whose record it is"); Chapman v. State, 628 A.2d 676, 683
(Md. 1993) (holding that bank's records of account would qualify as business records if
information is reported by an employee with a duty to report and recorded by an
employee with a duty to record); cf United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 964 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (holding that a witness's description of crime recorded in police officer's report
is not admissible because it "is not made in regular course of witness's business").
Apropos are the remarks in Wingate v. Emery Air FreightCorp., 432 N.E.2d 474 (Mass.
1982):
[I]f the iriginal source of information did not have a business interest to
report accurately, reliability is lacking. Thus, the statute makes admissible a
business record which results from reports, passing through any number of
people, so long as each person had a duty to report, and the information
originallycamefrom an employee with personal knowledge who also had a
duty to report. Then, and only then, are there the necessary indicia of
reliability. Only then may a record be substituted for the direct testimony of
the employee with personal knowledge.
Id. at 478 (emphasis added). See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4518, commentary at 4518:3
(McKinney 1992) which states:
The motive to make accurate observations, upon which the reliability of
business records depends, cannot be assumed when the person who supplied
the information that goes into the record are not members of the same
business enterprise. While co-employees may share an incentive to be
accurate and make reliable reports to one another, no such incentive is
operative in the case of outsiders. No sanctions or discipline can be imposed
on outsiders who are careless or dishonest.
Id. See Glen Weisenberger, Hearsay: Business Records and PublicRecords, 51 U. CIN.
L. REV. 42, 51 (1982) (stating that "each person in chain must be an employee or agent
of the business which retains the records in the regular course of its activity").
167. Johnson, 170 N.E. at 517. The Appellate Division opinion in Johnson was
even clearer. It said that the New York statute "refers to an act, transaction, occurrence
or event in which someone engaged in the business actually participated. The witnesses
of the accident who made statements to the policeman were not engaged in the police
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Of course, neither Johnson v. Lutz, nor any of the cases making similar
comments, focused on the issue of multiple businesses. Without much
instruction from the decided cases, what approach should the courts take? The
most reasonable reading of the business records exception would consider a
record as having been "made in the regular course of business" only if all
participants are employees or agents of the same business. For how can it be
said that a document is made in the regular course of business X if the person
furnishing the information has a loyalty to another business? Or to state it
differently, how can it is be said that a document is "made in the regular course
of business" where the declarant's business duty is to business Y and not to the
entrant, business X? In such a case, the declarant may not be as careful as he
would be if he were employed by business X and not business Y. White
Industries acknowledged the potential for such difficulty. The case took the
position that under 803(6) any such difficulty can be addressed under its separate
treatment of untrustworthiness. 68 However, the potential for difficulty alone
should be sufficient to disqualify the document as not made in the regular course
of business, and the separate untrustworthiness provision as to which169the

opponent has the burden should be irrelevant in reaching this conclusion.

Courts should be cautious in pushing the boundaries of the exception and
should not readily relax the business duty requirement. In doing so, courts are
substituting general criteria, circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, for the
exception's specific requirement that the document be "made in the regular

business in the course ofwhich the memorandum of the transaction was made." Johnson
v. Lutz, 234 N.Y.S. 328 (1929). Cf United States v. Pitman, 475 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir.

1973) (holding a document admissible if the information was supplied by an authorized
person; court admitted lost order form prepared by Avon from information transmitted
by an Avon independent sales representative because "a sales representative is an integral
part of the Avon organization" and thus, "not an outsider but rather an authorized
person").

168. White Indust. Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Mo.
1985).
169. Query whether White Industrieswould have taken the same view under the
Model Act, which does not have a lack of trustworthiness provision? See supra note 5.
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course of business. ' 170 Instead, litigants should be required to pursue other
possible avenues of admissibility (e.g. Rule 807), as previously discussed. 7'

B. Duty To Record
Most discussions of the business duty requirement focus on the declarant,
just as this Article does initially. Now let us put the spotlight on the entrant, and
ask-must the entrant be under a duty to record? Support can be found for the
proposition that the entrant must be acting under a duty to record in making the
entries just as a declarant must be acting under a duty to report in fumishing the
information."n And this makes sense. If the document being offered in evidence
was prepared by an employee whose duties did not include preparing that
particular type of document, it can scarcely be said that the document was "made
in the regular course of the employer's business.' ' 73 In addition, under 803(6)

170. This general standard was rejected not only by Congress but also by the
drafters of 803. Prior to the submission of the Supreme Court's text, the following
general standard for admission of hearsay was proposed:
GENERAL PROVISIONS. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its
nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer strong
assurances of accuracy and the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
ILLUSTRATIONS. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following examples of statements conforming with the requirements of this
rule...
46 F.R.D. 161, 377 (1969).
171. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
172. United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir.1948) (holding that where entrant records
information supplied by declarant, the document is admissible to prove truth of recorded
information, only if "it was part of the regular course of business to report to him what
the declarants themselves knew it was part of the business to record what they said");
Chapman v. State, 628 A.2d 676, 683 (Md. 1993); In re Leon RR, 397 N.E.2d 374, 377
(N.Y. 1979) (holding that for a document to be admissible the proponent must show "that
it was within the scope of the entrant's business duty to record the act.., sought to be
admitted"); Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930). Tennessee's codified exception
expressly requires a business duty to record. TENN. R. EVID. 803(6) (requiring "[a]
memorandum ... made ... by or from information transmitted by a person with
knowledge and a duty to record or transmit"). See also Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d
101, 108 (2d Cir. 1993).
If the entrant did not act under a duty to record, the document is not admissible
under the business records exceptionfor any purpose. In contrast, where the declarant
did not act under a duty but the entrant did, the document is admissible under 803(6) to
prove that the declarant made the statement but not to prove the truth of it, unless the
statement satisfies another hearsay exception. See supra note 139.
173. See United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1983). In
Robinson, a county purchasing clerk regularly made notes at Board of Supervisors
meetings for his use as a purchasing clerk. The court held them admissible under 803(6),

1999]

BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION

or a similar codification, the regular practice requirement would not be
satisfied. 74
The "duty to record" requirement, however, may be more inclusive. It may
also mean that the proponent must show that company procedures required the
entrant to reduce the information to writing. Thus, even assuming that an
employee's duties included the preparation of certain types of documents, the
documents would not be admissible unless they were made pursuant to the
company's established procedures.' 75 Viewed in this manner, this aspect of the
duty to record is already encompassed within the regularity requirements as
defined by Kennedy and Standard Oil."7

stating that the "notes may not be considered 'records of regularly conducted activity'
... absent a showing that [purchasing clerk] regularly compiled them as part of his
official duties .... This was not done." Id. Viewing the "duty to record" in this manner
makes sense because the exception applies to all types of businesses, including sole
proprietorships. See People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. 1986).
174. Robinson, 700 F.2d at 210. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
175. United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass. 1989) seems
supportive. In Ferber,a Merrill Lynch employee sent an E-mail message to his superior
relating a conversation he had with defendant Ferber. The employee had a "routine
practice" of sending E-mail messages to co-workers concerning important telephone
conversation with clients. However, the court did not admit the messages under 803(6)
because the employee "was under no business duty to make and maintain the E-mail
messages and the evidence failed to show that Merrill Lynch itself followed such a
routine." Id. The court noted that if such documents were admissible then "virtually any
document found in the files of a business which pertained in any way to the functioning
of the business would be admitted willy-nilly as a business record." Id. "This," the court
said, "is not the law." Id.
Ironically, the court noted that if Carey made E-mail messages concerning
important telephone conversations in running his household they might be admissible
"on a preliminary finding that Carey was the responsible individual for making and
maintaining such records." Id. at 98. This would be equally applicable to a sole
proprietorship.
Ferberdid not explain its basis for holding that Carey was under no business duty;
nor did it state whether the E-mail messages failed to satisfy the requirement that the
memorandum be made in the course of a regularly conducted business activity or the
regular practice requirement or some other requirements. However, it seems that in
Ferberthe court was not saying that the employee had acted beyond the scope of his
duties. Rather, the court was apparently excluding the E-mail because the business had
no established procedures for making and retaining such messages. In short, the
employee had no obligation to advise his co-workers in writing.
176. See supra notes 108, 112 and accompanying text.
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IV. DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY BUSINESS S AND SENT TO
BUSINESS R
The admissibility of memoranda or records prepared by Company S
("Sender" or "S") and sent to Company R ("Receiver" or "R") is another issue
that has not been well scrutinized. Loose language and the absence of analysis,
much less clear analysis, characterizes some of the cases addressing the issue.
For example, in United States v. Flom,' invoices received and held by
defendant from another company were admitted in evidence based on defendant
employee's testimony "that the invoices were received and held in the regular
course of [defendant's] business."'7 Such testimony, however, only established
that defendant had a regular practice to maintain invoices received from another
company. It did not establish any of the foundation requirements of 803(6),
including that the documents were made in the regular course of either
defendant's or sender's business, or that either business had a regular practice to
make them. There simply was no valid basis on which the Fifth Circuit
approved the admissibility of the invoices under 803(6). Unlike the Flom court,
most courts have recognized that the mere filing and retaining in the regular

course of business papers received from another business does not qualify the
179
papers under the business records exception.

177. 558 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977).
178. Id. at 1182. See also United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 812 n.1 1 (1st
Cir. 1996); Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that documents received and filed admissible under 803(6)); Fernandez v. Chios
Shipping Co., 542 F.2d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 1976) (admitting marine surveyor's reports that
Time Charterer "ordered, received and recorded in the regular and ordinary course of
business"; apparently no one offered the reports as the business records of the marine
surveyor); Boesl v. Suburban Trust & Say. Bank, 642 F. Supp. 1503, 1508 (D. Del.
1986); Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 854 S.W.2d 321,
328 (Ark. 1993) (holding that an independent lab test report prepared for Forgecraft of
steel Forgecraft was selling to military admissible under 803(6) as "record acquired and
maintained by Forgecraft in regular course of business" because military required an
independent test).
179. Synder v. Whittaker, 839 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 429 F.2d 921,
927 (1st Cir. 1970); Phillips v. United States, 356 F.2d 297, 307 (9th Cir. 1965) (under
Section 1732), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 952 (1966); Marshall Trucking Co. v. State, 743
S.W.2d 16 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Pollard, 503 N.E.2d 548 (111. 1987); Leen Co.
v. Web Elec. Inc., 611 A.2d 83 (Me. 1992) (holding that the fact that document is
received in the ordinary course of business does not alone satisfy 803(6)'s foundation
requirements; Maine's 803(6) "applies only to the records of the authors of the letters,
not the recipient"); People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1995). But see United
States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 812 n.ll (1st Cir. 1996).
The reason for this rule, the New York Court of Appeals explained, is that the
receiving entity is generally in no position to establish the necessary foundation
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Some circuits have admitted documents prepared by S which were sent to
and maintained by R if witnesses testified that R integrated them into its records
and relied on them in its operations. 8 ° Ollag ConstructionEquipment Corp. v.

requirements. Cratsley,660 N.E.2d at 397. The court stated:
It is true that as a rule, 'the mere filing of papers received from other entities,
even if they are retained in the regular course of business, is insufficient to
qualify the documents as business records'. An objection for lack of
foundation is warranted when 'the writing is a business record but received
from another business entity.' The reason for this rule is that [s]uch papers
are not made in the regular course of business of the recipient, who is in no
position to provide the necessary foundation testimony as to the regularity and
timeliness of their preparation or the source of information contained in the
records. Nor, generally, would the recipient be aware whether the information
was imparted by one under a 'business duty' to report to the entrant.
Id. (citations omitted). In other words, retention alone by R of a document received from
S does not satisfy any of the foundation requirements of 803(6) to admit the document
as R's business record. However, if R offers it as S's business record, and R produces
a qualified witness to testify to the necessary foundation requirements-that it was made
in the regular course of S's business and that S had a regular practice to make such
documents-then it should be admitted under the business records exception.
180. See United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1993) (admitting
as business records, documents produced from auto dealers' files which were prepared
by and received from a credit company and an automobile manufacturer, where the
documents "were kept in the regular course of business at the dealerships" and that the
dealerships relied on them in keeping track of their cars); United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d
221, 223 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Ullrich, 580
F.2d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 1978). In Ullrich,a computer inventory schedule of dealership's
cars prepared by Ford Motor Credit ("Ford") which was integrated into dealership's
records and used by it, admitted under 803(6) to prove that a car in defendant's
possession was stolen from the dealer. Id. The opinion notes that the inventory schedule
was used by the dealership to "cross check the amount of interest paid" to Ford and as
a record disclosing whether a car was sold, transferred to another dealer, or in inventory.
Id. However, so far as the opinion reveals, Ford, not the dealer, made the record and
periodically inspected the cars on the dealer's lot to confirm the inventory. Neither the
government, which offered the schedules, nor the court apparently thought of considering
the schedules as Ford's business records. See also United States v. Carranco, 551 F.2d
1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 1997); Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp. v. Goldman, 665 F.2d 43, 46
(2d Cir. 1981); Black Sea & Baltic Gen'l Ins. Co. v. S.S. Hellenic Destiny, 575 F. Supp.
685 690-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that commercial invoices of one company
admissible under 803(6) where witnesses of company that received them testified that
they were kept in the files and relied on in the regular course of business); Plymouth
Rock Fuel Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 498 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). But
see White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 n.3 (W.D. Mo.
1985) ("The mere fact that a business obtains information from an outside source and
'integrates' that information into its own files seems to me, absent some other
circumstance, to be an insufficient predicate for Rule 803(6) admissibility.").
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Goldman provides a good example. There, corporate principals submitted
financial statements to Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company in connection
with a possible bank loan to the corporation. After noting that other circuits had
admitted documents where witnesses testified that the documents were integrated
into a company's records and were relied on in daily operations, the Second
Circuit held the financial statements admissible under 803(6) because "the
[t]estimony established that the financial statements were on the Bank's own
form, were completed at its request and were of the type regularly used by the
Bank in making decisions whether or not to extend credit."''
The court,

United States v. Jakobetz illustrates the lack of clarity in this area. First, it confused
authentication with hearsay. In Jakobetz, the defendant's employee submitted to
defendant "Trip Cost Report" that included a Throgs Neck Bridge toll receipt in order to
be reimbursed for the toll expense. Defendant objected to admission of the toll receipt
to prove the date and time of the toll on the ground that it was not "authenticated by a
person with first-hand knowledge of the Throgs Neck Bridge record system." Jakobetz,
995 F.2d at 800. The court responded that it did not read 803(6) so narrowly and that
defendant's employer incorporated the toll receipt into its record "to a sufficient degree
to permit an inference as to the receipt's authenticity." Id. But authenticity is an issue
of relevancy to be decided under Rule 901, not a hearsay issue to be decided under 803.
The toll receipt apparently would have been admissible under 901(4).
Second, to the extentJakobetz admitted the toll receipt under 803(6), it erroneously
relied on cases admitting business records of S which R integrated into its records. In
Jakobetz, there was no showing that R relied on the "time" stamped on the toll receipt.
In other words, the proponent did not introduce evidence to show that the employee
would not have been reimbursed if the toll receipt bore the date, but not the time the toll
was paid. Under such circumstances, the "integration" concept is not applicable. See,
e.g., N.L.R.B. v. First Termite Control Co., 646 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1981)
Furthermore, in relying on the "integration" concept, Jakobetz overlooked the fact
that an employee, not an outsider, submitted the outsider's toll receipts. The employee
therefore was the declarant and the toll receipt he submitted was simply a shorthand way
of relating to the entrant, his employer, the details (date, time, and amount) of which he
had personal knowledge. None of the "integration" cases Jakobetz cited involved a
declarant-employee who had personal knowledge of the information and, thus, could
have furnished it without the outsider's document; rather, they involved outsider
documents submitted by outsiders. The "integration" concept was therefore irrelevant.
In other words, if defendant's employee was under a business duty to supply the
information (date and time of the toll) of which he had personal knowledge, then the toll
receipt should have been admissible as part of the reimbursement form; that is, as
defendant's employer's business record. However, if the employee was not under such
a duty and would have been reimbursed without it, then any entries he made relating to
"time" were not made in the regular course of business.
Finally, the court said that "Jakobetz himself relied on its authenticity, when he
submitted the receipt for reimbursement." Jakobetz,995 F.2d at 801. If so, why did the
court not admit the toll receipt as an admission?
181. Ollag, 665 F.2d at 46.
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therefore, concluded that the financial statements "satisfied the primary
requirements" of the business records exception.'
The court's conclusion is fascinating since the financial statements did not
satisfy any of the requirements. Neither the entrant nor the declarant was a Bank
employee or agent. Thus, the statements were not prepared in the course of the
Bank's regularly conducted business activity. Likewise, it cannot be said that
it was the Bank's regular practice to make financial statements for the principals
of a prospective borrower. Furthermore, the financial statements probably would
not have been admissible as business records of the corporate principals. Since
they apparently were prepared specifically for the purpose of obtaining a loan,
the financial statements would not have satisfied the regularity requirements.
General statements that a document is admissible if a witness testifies that
R integrated the document into its files and relied on it are not very helpful.
They substitute clich6s for analysis. The requirements for admissibility under
803(6) or any other business records exception for a written record of S received
by R should be no different from the requirements for any other document. The
question that must be answered in all cases is: Has the proponent established
each of the foundation requirements for admissibility? To answer this question,
a court must first require the proponent to state whose document is being offered
in evidence-S's, R's, or both. Depending on the proponent's offer, the court
can then coherently analyze the admissibility issue. If the proponent offers the
document as S's business record, it should be admissible if, apart from any other
requirements, the proponent establishes that the document was prepared in S's
regularly conducted business activity and that it was S's regular practice to make
it. In short, the proponent must show that S's document satisfies each of the
foundation requirements of the applicable business records exception. If the
proponent fails to do so, the document should not be admitted as S's business
record.
If, however, the document is offered as R's business record, it should not
be admissible if the proponent only shows that R received and filed it,'83 nor
should the document be admissible if R integrated it into its records if integration
means only that R relied on it. R's reliance alone obviously does not satisfy the
regularity requirements of the business records exception.' 84 However, if the
proponent shows more, namely, that R integrated S's document into its records
in such a way that R can be deemed to be a maker of the document, the
document should be admissible if all other foundation requirements are met.
Duncan Development,Inc. v. Harvey18 5 provides a perfect example. In Duncan,
182. Id.
183. See supra note 12.
184. To paraphrase the court in Berkowitz, the fact that R relied on the document
does not supply the critical evidence that S made and preserved it in the regular course
of business. United States v. Berkowtiz, 429 F.2d 921, 927 (lst Cir. 1970). See also
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar Corp., 828 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
185. 634 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982).
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a subcontractor's invoices satisfied the Texas business records exception because
the contractor checked "to see whether the subcontractor's work had been
performed and whether the submitted invoices were proper for payment."'18 6 The
invoices, therefore, "became
[the contractor's] record of its subcontractor's
87
activities and charges."'
Greater care by the courts in this area would go a long way in clearing up
the existing confusion. As noted, the key lies in first identifying whose
document is being offered, and then determining whether each of the exception's
foundation requirements has been satisfied. If courts take these basic steps,
clarity might prevail.
V. DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY PROFESSIONAL FIRM A FOR
COMPANY B
A. Are They the Business Records of the ProfessionalFirm or Its
Client?
Another challenging situation is whether expert reports prepared by an
independent party, such as a professional firm, at the request of a customer are
admissible under the business records exception. Certainly, the first question
that should be asked is whether such reports are, for purposes of the business
records exception, documents of the independent professional firm or of the
person requesting them. 8 8 At first blush, it seems obvious that such documents
are the business records of the firm that prepared them. Indeed, under Section
1732, the Second Circuit indicated that a report prepared by a professional at the

186. Id. at 814.

187. Id. at 813-14. The documents would also have been admissible as the
subcontractor's business records, but as far as the opinion shows, the proponent neither
offered them as such, nor did it lay the appropriate foundation. See also United States
v. Carranco, 551 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a freight bill
initially prepared by Admiral-Merchants was also deemed made in regular course of

ICX's business because ICX used the freight bill to verify the shipment and made
notations of any discrepancies).

188. See infra note 215 for a discussion of the extent to which such reports are
admissible.
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request of a third party is clearly part of the professional's business.' 89 However,
recent cases have not answered the question either directly or with consistency.
In Waddell v. Commissioner,'90 plaintiffs offered into evidence an appraisal

prepared for Comp-U-Med 9' of computer terminals that plaintiffs had purchased
from Comp-U-Med. Without discussing or deciding whose business record was
being offered, the Ninth Circuit held that the appraisal was not admissible as a
Comp-U-Med business record because there was no showing "that Comp-UMed obtained appraisals of this sort as a 'regular practice."" 192 The implication
is that if the proponent had shown that Comp-U-Med regularly commissioned
appraisals, the appraisal would have been admissible. But why? All that such
evidence would establish is that Comp-U-Med had a regular practice to obtain
appraisals, not a regular practice to make them as 803(6) requires. 93
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the appraisal was inadmissible as a
business record of the appraisal firm because there was no showing that the
appraisal firm "had a regular practice of preparing appraisals for Comp-UMed."' 94 However, if the appraisal firm had a regular practice of preparing

189. White v. Zutell, 263 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1959). In White, the Second Circuit
concluded that the medical report of a doctor who had examined the plaintiff at the
request of an insurance company was admissible as part of the doctor's business. "The
making of this report," the court said, "was clearly a part of their specialist's 'business';
indeed, that is what he was commissioned to do." Id. at 615. Accord Yates v. Bear
Trans., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 681, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Trout,
701 P.2d 851, 856 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing admissibility of an appraisal of
property made by an independent appraiser for the owner, the court said that business
records admissible under 803(6) "must have been prepared and retained as part of the
normal course of business of the party preparing them").
190. 841 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1988).
191. The professional appraiser died before trial. Id. at 267.
192. Id. In Selig v. UnitedStates, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984), the court admitted
under 803(6) the appraisals the Brewers obtained of its player roster shortly after it
purchased the Seattle Pilots. In admitting two appraisals apparently as the Brewers'
business records, the Seventh Circuit stated that the appraisals satisfied the rule's
"regularity requirements." The court did not explain how such requirements had been
met other than to state that "the appraisals were prepared in the regular course of the
management of the team." Id. at 578. Under any view, the appraisals should not have
been admitted as the Brewers' business records. The Brewers did not prepare the
appraisals, and there was no indication that the Brewers even prepared other appraisals.
Further, the evidence indicated that this was the first time the Brewers had ever obtained
such appraisals. Apparently, no one suggested that the appraisals were the business
records of the appraisers, and the court did not consider the issue.
193. In Rancho Oil Co. v. UnitedStates, 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-308 (D. Tex. 1978),
the court held that a real estate appraisal was admissible under 803(6) and other rules
because plaintiff kept the appraisal in conjunction with the transfer of real estate and,
further, plaintiff had a customary practice to obtain such real estate appraisals.
194. Waddell, 841 F.2d at 267. The court noted with approval the tax court's
observation that "if the report were admissible as the appraiser's business record 'any
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appraisals of computer terminals generally, why should the fact that it prepared
only one such appraisal for Comp-U-Med mean that the appraisal firm did not
have a regular practice for purposes of 803(6)? The focus should be on the
regularity of making appraisals, not on the entity for whom they are made. If
courts use the Waddell approach, they should exclude a lab report of a routine
test, such as a pregnancy test,unless the lab regularly makes reports of such tests
for the person requesting the test, a result that makes little sense.
The Waddell court did not cite its earlier decision in Paddack v. Dave
Christensen, Inc.,' which addressed the admissibility of an accountant's
compliance audit report under 803(6).196 In Paddack,Touche Ross was hired to
audit an employer's contributions to trust funds for shop employees to determine
the fund contribution deficiencies because the trustees suspected that the
employer's reports were incorrect. 7 The trustees did not have a regular
compliance audit procedure; they hired an accountant to do an audit only when
they suspected a deficiency. 98 Because the audits were conducted with an
"irregular frequency," the court concluded that, "the audit reports were not kept
in the course of a regularly conducted business activity of the Trust Funds or the
Employer."' 9 9 And because it was a special audit and not one regularly
conducted, the court went on to hold that the accountant's reports were not
Touche Ross's business records within the meaning of 803(6).200 It commented
that "[a] contrary interpretation would allow any firm to produce 'business
records' that would be automatically admissible. Such reports do not contain the
same reliability that normally attends records kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity."' '
A contrary interpretation, however, would not automatically produce
admissible business records. The records would be admissible only if they met
the foundation requirements of 803(6). Paddackmay have assumed that each
such compliance audit report would always be considered a special report that
does not satisfy the regular practice provision or the requirement that the
document be "made in the course of a regularly conducted business activity."

appraisal report prepared by any appraising company in the country would come in
without the appraiser having to be there to verify it."' Id.
195. 745 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1984).

196. The Ninth Circuit indicated that a traditional financial statement audit is
generally admissible under Rule 803(6) as a business record of the audited entity;
whether it could ever be the accountant's record, the court said, "is best left for another
day." Id. at 1257 n.3.
197. Id. at 1257-58, 1258 n.6.
198. Id. at 1258.
199. Id. More fundamentally, however, the audit reports were not the employer's
or trust fund's business records because neither the employer nor the trust funds prepared
them; they were prepared by an independent firm.

200. Id.
201. Id.
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Such an assumption may not be justified. Because an accounting firm such as
Touche Ross regularly prepared compliance audit reports for clients, it would
seem that such reports should be deemed made in the course of the accounting
firm's regularly conducted business activity.20 2
In contrast to Paddack,the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Frazier0°3 had
no difficulty concluding that an accounting firm's regulatory compliance audit
report was admissible as the firm's business record. The audit was performed
at the request of the Department of Labor ("DOL") to determine whether funds
it had provided were expended for their intended use.20" The accounting firm
was under a ten year contract to perform regulatory audits for the DOL and had
previously audited the company in question. Without much discussion, the court
held that the audit report was made in the course of the accounting firm's regular
business activity and that it was that firm's regular practice to make such a
report.20 5 In a final observation that should be applicable to almost any
accounting firm audit report, the court noted, "[a]s an accounting firm, Sorensen
[the firm] regularly prepared audit reports." 2'

202. The Paddackopinion does not indicate whether Touche Ross did compliance
audits on a regular basis for clients. Independent of its holding that the compliance audit
reports did not meet the foundation threshold requirement under 803(6), the court noted
that even if they were Touche Ross's business records, they were inadmissible because
they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. This conclusion also seems troubling.
The audit was not prepared in anticipation of any litigation in which Touche Ross was
involved. To paraphrase the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Frazier,53 F.3d 1105
(10th Cir. 1995), Touche Ross was a neutral third party with nothing to gain from any
possible litigation against the audited entity. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
But maybe, once the independent professional firm is aware that the audit's use lies
outside the regular business activities of the requesting firm, it can no longer be said that
the audit is being performed in the regular course of business.
203. 53 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1995).
204. Id. at 1109. Similarly, in Condus v. HowardSay. Bank, 986 F. Supp. 914,
916-19 (D.N.J. 1997), reports of a consulting firm hired by a bank's governance
committee to make an independent assessment of the bank's procedures were admitted
as consulting firm's business records where firm's entire business was to analyze banks
and issue reports of their findings.
205. Frazier,53 F.3d at 1110.
206. Id. The court then rejected the defendant's contention that the audit report
was untrustworthy because it allegedly was prepared for litigation purposes. Id. See also
U.S. v. Blackwell, 954 F. Supp. 944, 974 (D.N.J. 1997). Relying on Frazier,the court
admitted under 803(6) a special investigation audit report prepared by bank's financial
audit department based on testimony that audit department would routinely investigate
and prepare reports when it was determined that bank policy had been violated. The
court's reliance on Frazieris misplaced. Frazierinvolved an audit by an independent
accounting firm, not an internal audit department.
In Birch v. Township of Drummer, 487 N.E.2d 798 (II. App. Ct. 1985), the Town
hired an independent engineering firm to review all traffic signs in the county and
determine where more signs were necessary. Id. at 805. In holding the engineering
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In a different context, an Illinois court20 7 did not discuss whether a testing
service company's reports of ultrasonic tests of spindle pins performed at
defendant's request were defendant's business records or those of the testing
service company."' Rather, it simply treated them as defendant's business
records2" and held them admissible under 803(6), explaining:
The key consideration is the authority of the third party to act on the
business' behalf. Where a third party is authorized by a business to
generate the record at issue, the record is of no use to the business
unless it is accurate and, therefore, the record bears sufficient indicia
of reliability to qualify as a business record under the hearsay rule.210
While it may be true, as the court said, that the reports were of no use to
defendant unless they were accurate, this is not a proper basis for their admission
as business records. A document is not admissible under the business records
exception simply because it "bears sufficient indicia of reliability." It is
admissible only if it meets each of the exception's foundation requirements, one
of which is that the record must be made in the regular course of the maker's
business. Here, defendant did not make the reports. Of course, this only means
that the reports should not have been admitted as defendant's business records.
It does not mean that the reports were completely inadmissible under 803(6).
Had the Illinois court recognized that the reports were the testing company's
business records, as it should have done, the reports would have been admissible
because they apparently satisfied the foundation requirements. Nevertheless, the
Illinois case illustrates the lack of clarity in this area.
People v. Cratsley" also illustrates how a court's failure to recognize and
deal with the issue of whose business records were being offered into evidence
muddies the waters. In Cratsley, an association for retarded citizens ("ARC")
ran a sheltered workshop which accepted no one into the program without an
evaluation report prepared in accordance with ARC's requirements. Rhors, an
independent psychologist, prepared an IQ test report of X that the court admitted

firm's report admissible under its version of the Model Act, the court stated that "[w]e
see no difference between this particular report and an audit or inventory report prepared
at the request of one business organization by another. The report was useless unless
accurate." Id. at 806. Although there was no evidence that the engineering firm
regularly made such safety studies, the court did not consider its effect on the report's
admissibility; nor did the court clearly indicate whether it considered the report the
business record of the town or the engineering firm.
207. See Argueta v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R. R., 586 N.E.2d 386
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
208. The tests were performed as part of defendant's "routine testing the spindle
pins." Id.
209. The parties probably did not raise the issue.
210. Argueta, 586 N.E.2d at 392 (citations omitted).
211. 653 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1995).
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under New York's business records exception ("CPLR 4518") to prove X's IQ.
The court noted that Rohrs was acting on ARC's behalf and according to its
requirements, and that his report conformed to statutory and regulatory
requirements."1 Based on the above, the testimony that such reports were an
absolute condition to anyone being accepted in the program, and that ARC
routinely relied on them, the court concluded that the evidence established that
Rohrs's report satisfied both regularity requirements." 3
The obvious question is: How could the court decide that the regularity

requirements were met without first deciding whose record was being offered in
evidence? It is the regular practice of that entity that is relevant. ARC neither
prepared the report, nor did it supply the information. The fact that no one was
admitted to the program without such a report only establishes that ARC had a
regular practice to obtain such reports, not that ARC had a regular practice to
make them. Quite clearly, Rohrs was the maker as well as the declarant because
he prepared the report that was admitted, and the report contained Rohrs's
opinion. Thus, the court should have inquired into Rohrs's, not ARC's, regular
practice. But the court did not do so because it failed to first decide whose
business record was being offered.
To be sure, the court and ARC believed the report was trustworthy.
However, this is not the test of admissibility under the business records
exception. To quote the Court of Appeals in Kennedy, "the requirements of
[New York's business records exception] CPLR 4518(a)
... must be satisfied,
214
however reliable such records may otherwise be.,
In summary, when considering documents prepared by an independent
professional X for business Y, the first question that must be decided is: Whose
document is being offered? Courts have not decisively dealt with the issue and
have not given it much attention. For purposes of the exception, it seems that
such a document should be considered the document of the firm that prepares it.
Stated otherwise, for purposes of the business records exception, financial

212. Id. at 1167.
213. Id. The foundation witness, however, was unable to relate Rohrs's specific
record-making practice. Id. In reaching its decision, the court also noted that the rule,
that the mere filing of a document received from another entity is not sufficient to satisfy
CPLR 4518, was not applicable. The court stated that the reason for this rule is that:
Such papers simply are not made in the regular course of business of the
recipient, who is in no position to provide the necessary foundation testimony
as to the regularity and timeliness of their preparation or the source of
information contained in the records. Nor, generally, would the recipient be
aware whether the information was imparted by one under a "business duty"
to report to the entrant.
Id. (citations omitted). Although Rohrs was not an ARC employee, the court found the
rule inapplicable because "Rohrs was also not a complete outsider"; in preparing the
report Rohrs acted on ARC's behalf and in accordance with its requirements. Id.
214. People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501, 505 (N.Y. 1986).
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statements prepared by accounting firm X for business Y should be deemed the
business records of accounting firm X, engineering reports those of the
engineering firm, lab tests those of the laboratory, appraisal reports those of the
appraisal firm, and so on. At the very least, courts should require a proponent
to identify the entity whose document is being offered under the exception and
then to satisfy the exception's foundation requirements for a business record of
that entity.
B. Extent ofAdmissibility
Assuming that a professional report is admissible under the business records
exception, 'a court must then determine the extent to which it is admissible. Let
us take a hypothetical appraisal report by A, an expert appraiser, of the market
value of X's house which X wishes to sell. Assuming that the appraisal report
stating the appraiser's opinion satisfies the foundation requirements and that the
proponent has shown A's expert qualifications,2"5 the report should be admissible
under the business records exception to prove A's opinion unless the opponent
shows that it is untrustworthy. However, this does not mean that the portion of
the appraisal report which states the underlying facts on which A relied is
equally admissible. If the factual portion of the report is offered to show only
the basis of A's opinion, but not to prove the truth of the facts stated, it should

be admissible for that limited function, 216 provided that the facts are of a type
reasonably relied on by appraisers in the field.217 But if the report is offered to
prove the truth of the facts stated, it should not be admissible unless the
information was furnished by a declarant with first-hand knowledge who had a
business duty to report to A or satisfied another hearsay exception. 2 8 For
example, if A used comparable sales of other houses to arrive at his opinion of
the value of X's house, the portion of A's report containing the details of those
comparable sales, including prices and surrounding circumstances, would not be
admissible to prove the truth of those details unless the proponent established
that the sales information was secured from someone with personal knowledge
who was under a business duty to report the information to A.

215. See infra notes 219-43 and accompanying text.
216. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 62, (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that

statements forming part of basis of expert's opinion properly admitted under Section
1732, whether or not true).
217. See FED. R. EVID. 703. This rule provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Id.
218. Bohle, 445 F.2d at 62-63. See also supra note 139 and accompanying text.

1999]

BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION

VI. APPLICATION OF OTHER EVIDENTIARY RULES TO BuSINESs
RECORDS

A document offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted
in the document is not admissible under the hearsay rule2 9 unless it falls within
an exception. Thus, if the proponent can establish the foundation requirements
of the business records exception, the hearsay barrier will be lifted. We will now
examine whether a document admissible under that exception is immune from

exclusion under any other rule of evidence, or whether it is subject to other
evidentiary rules to the same extent as if live testimony were being offered. As
we will see, not every court is sensitive to the fact that the business records
exception is an exception to the hearsay rule only, and not to all other
evidentiary rules.
In United States v. Licavoli,220 the defendant objected to the admission
under 803(6) of an appraisal report"' because the government had not
established, as required by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, m that the
person who made the appraisal had the necessary expert qualifications. m After
noting that the question raised "is one for which there is little helpful
precedent," 224 the Ninth Court concluded that there was no reason to adopt an
"inflexible rule" requiring the proponent to establish affirmatively the
qualifications of the person whose opinion is contained in the business records.'m
In so doing, the court shifted the burden to the opponent by requiring the
opponent to raise any 2qualification
deficiencies under 803(6)'s lack of
26
trustworthiness provision.
Licavoli apparently overlooked the express language of 803 and the
Advisory Committee's Note, both of which limit the evidentiary function of the
listed hearsay exceptions. Rule 803 itself makes it perfectly clear that the Rule

219. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801.
220. 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979).
221. The appraisal of stolen artwork had been made for the owner and her
insurance company. Apparently the court did not consider whether the appraisal was the
business record of the appraiser for purposes of the exception; it admitted the appraisal
as the insurance company's business record. Id. at 622.
222. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Id.
223. The defendant did not claim that the government failed to establish the
foundation requirements of 803(6). Licavoli, 604 F.2d at 622.
224. Id. at 622.
225. Id.
226. United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1979).
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is nothing more than an exception to Rule 802 (the hearsay rule) when it
expressly says: "the following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule ..
228
This point is underscored in the Advisory Committee's Note:
The exceptions are phrased in terms of nonapplication of the hearsay
rule, rather than in positive terms of admissibility, in order to repel any
implication that other possible grounds for exclusion are eliminated
from consideration.
Unlike the Licavoli court, other courts, both state and federal, have
concluded that if an appropriate objection is made, the proponent of a business
record otherwise admissible under 803(6) bears the burden of establishing the
document's admissibility under any other evidentiary rule, just as it would if live
testimony were being offered. Stated otherwise, in contrast to Licavoli, there are
federal and state decisions applying 803(6) or a comparable business records
exception that have treated all other evidentiary rules as independent hurdles to
the admissibility of a business record. 229

227. See supra note 12.
228. 56 F.R.D. 186, 303 (1973). See Forward Communications v. United States,
608 F.2d 485 (Ct. CI. 1979) (noting that 803(6) merely provides that business records are
not excluded by Rule 802 but that "nothing in Rule 803 says they may not be excluded
by some other rule").
229. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling document admissible
under Rule 803(6) inadmissible under Rule 403); Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80
F.3d 777, 786 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Rule 403 to redact references to the diagnosis of
Mesothelioma contained in autopsy reports and hospital records admitted under 803(6),
stating the Rule 803 "does not mandate admission of this evidence, but rather allows
evidence to be admitted when it would otherwise be objectionable hearsay"); Higgins v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 752 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1985) (considering Rule 403 in
connection with document admitted under 803(6)); Prater v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Ky. 1997) (holding that 803(6) only satisfies hearsay
aspect of business record and any entry inadmissible "for another reason" does not
become admissible because it is contained in a business record; court therefore excluded
social workers' recorded opinions because the social workers were "insufficiently
qualified to render expert opinions"). See also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Trout, 701 P.2d
851, 856 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) ("[R]ecords must be introduced through the testimony of
a custodian who can be cross-examined concerning the methods of preparation, the
qualifications of the preparer, and other relevant matters.").
Montana's Rule 803(6) does not contain the phrase "by or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge." It was not included because Montana law,
pre-803(6), did not specifically require compliance with the personal knowledge rule.
The Montana Commission indicates that if there is insufficient personal knowledge, then
the opponent should show it as part of his burden to establish lack of trustworthiness.
MONT. R. EvID. 803(6) commission notes. However, given the introductory statement
of Montana's Rule 803 that "the following are not excluded by the hearsay requirement
rule. . ." personal knowledge under Montana's Rule 601 should be relevant despite the
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If the discussion stopped at this point, there should be no question that Rule
702 should have been applied to the Licavoli appraisal report. However, 803(6)
itself expressly provides for the admissibility of memoranda or records, not only
of "acts" or "events," but also of "opinions" and "diagnoses." How does the
inclusion of "opinions" in 803(6) affect the applicability of the opinion rules to
business records which otherwise satisfy 803(6)'s foundation requirements? The
answer should be that it does not. Section 1732, the predecessor of 803(6), did
not contain the words "opinions" or "diagnoses. 23 ° It referred only to a
memorandum of any "act, transaction, occurrence or event," which may have led
some courts to exclude diagnostic entries in business records.23 , Accordingly,
in such cases, the proponent was required to call a witness to testify in court
about the diagnosis. To make clear that such entries in business records should
be treated the same as entries of acts or events, Congress included in 803(6)
"opinions" and "diagnoses" as well as "acts" and "events. 2 32 Thus, whether the

business record isa record of acts or of opinions, 803(6) prevents it from being
excluded by the hearsay rule and thereby obviates the need to call a witness to

testify in court. In other words, the inclusion of the words "opinions" and
"diagnoses" simply insured that opinion and diagnostic entries now had the same
protection against a hearsay objection "acts" or "events" enjoyed pre-803(6).
However, since by its express terms Rule 803 only lifts the hearsay barrier and
does not otherwise mandate admissibility, any memorandum, whether of an act
or of an opinion, should be subject to other evidentiary rules, including those
relating to233 testimonial qualifications such as qualifications for expert
testimony.
This approach, in contrast to Licavoli's, may result in a very practical
difference. Under Rule 702, the proponent has the burden to satisfy the

Commission's explanation as to why a personal knowledge requirement was not included
in Rule 803(6). In other words, given that Rule 803(6) only lifts the hearsay barrier and
not the express requirement of Rule 601, the omission from Rule 803(6) of a personal
knowledge requirement should be irrelevant.
230. See supra note 7.
231. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 309 (1973).
232. Id. States have omitted the words from 803(6). Ohio omitted "opinions or
diagnosis." OHIO R. EVID. 803(6). South Carolina omitted "opinions" from its version
of 803(6). S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5-5 10 (Law Co-op 1997).
233. Florida and Kentucky expressly provide for the exclusion of a person's
opinions and diagnosis in a business record otherwise admissible under 803(6), unless
the person would be permitted to testify about them in court. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803
(1997) (stating that person's opinion and diagnosis in an otherwise admissible business
record are admissible only to the extent the person would be permitted to testify to them);
KY. R. EVID. 803(6); see also N.J. R. EVID. 808 (providing that an expert opinion in
business record is not admissible if declarant has not been produced as a witness, unless
"trial judge finds that the circumstances involved in rendering the opinion... tend to
establish its trustworthiness").
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foundation requirements for the admissibility of an expert's testimony."4 On the
other hand, under 803(6), the opponent has the burden of showing a lack of
trustworthiness. In Licavoli, the government introduced no evidence of the
expert's qualifications. Thus, if Licavoli had applied Rule 702 independent of
803(6), the appraisal report would not have been admitted, just the opposite of
the result reached.
One commentator has expressed the view that "Licavoliis more consistent
with the structure of the Federal Rule [803(6)], which explicitly admits
opinions.. ."35 However, given 803's express and unambiguous introductory
language, not contained in its predecessor, 1 6 it seems that Rule 702 should apply
to any document offered under 803(6), and that the proponent should have the
burden of establishing that the opinion was expressed by a qualified person.
There appears to be no reason why opinions expressed in a document should be
accorded better treatment than opinions expressed in court by live witnesses
available for cross-examination.~7

234. See supra note 222.
235. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 287, at 268 n. 15 (John William Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992).
236. See supra note 7.
237. A related and more basic question is whether the word "opinions" covered by
803(6) includes expert opinions. The question has scarcely been raised and almost all
courts have assumed that expert opinions are included. Recently, a federal district court
rejected, without analysis, defendant's argument that expert reports "by definition cannot
constitute a business record admissible under Rule 803(6)," stating that defendant did not
cite any support for the "conclusory assertion." Condus v. Howard Sav. Bank, 986 F.
Supp. 914, 918 (D.N.J. 1997). The court relied on cases that admitted expert reports, but
none of them discussed the issue of whether 803(6) covered expert opinions.
The Court of Claims's decision in Forward Communications Corp. v. United
States, 608 F.2d. 485 (Ct. Cl. 1979), is perhaps the only opinion squarely addressing the
question in holding an appraiser's report inadmissible. After referring to the Advisory
Committee's Note to 803(6), the court concluded that the word "opinions" refers to those
statements "which are incident to or part of factual reports of contemporaneous events
or transactions" and not to expert opinions. Id. at 511. Reports prepared to state expert
opinions, the court said, are inadmissible unless, pursuant to Rules 702 and 705, the
expert is in court to testify as to his qualifications and to be cross-examined. Id. The
court expressed the concern that if 803(6) were construed to override the opinion rules,
then every appraiser's report "would be admissible upon the mere showing that the
preparer was in the business of making such appraisals, without more." Id. at 510. This
should not be a concern, however, because the court has discretion to exclude the expert
opinion under Rules 403 and 702. See United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694
F.2d 312, 323 (4th Cir. 1982); Dell Publ'g Co. v. Whedon, 577 F. Supp. 1459, 1464-65
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that "[w]here, as here, the opinions merely record the
readers' [editors'] subjective evaluations of the quality of the manuscript, cross
examination is essential to fix the authors' precise meaning, their basis of comparison,
and even the good faith of theirjudgments"). The Whedon court did not believe 803(6)
covered such opinions. Id.
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Until now, we have discussed the application of other evidentiary rules in
the context of 803(6). Now, let us turn to the Model Act, which is phrased in
positive terms of admissibility, not in terms of nonapplication of the hearsay
rules. By its terms, the Model Act provides that if the trial judge finds that a
memorandum or record meets the statutory criteria, it "shall be admissible in
evidence" as proof of the matter recorded.3 8 Read literally, this business records
exception statute makes a memorandum or record admissible even if other valid
evidentiary objections exist. Such a reading is buttressed by the additional
provision in the Model Act, not found in 803(6), that "all other circumstances"
of the making of the record "shall not affect its admissibility." 9 Of course, to
interpret the statute as overcoming every evidentiary barrier would be ludicrous.
It would mean that even an irrelevant document that satisfied the business
records exception would be admissible, a result that could not reasonably have
been intended. 40 Although the Model Act does not contain language indicating

ForwardCommunicationsis problematic. First, 803(6) uses the word "opinions"
without any qualifications. Second, 803(6) also covers diagnoses and a diagnosis usually
requires expertise. What is the difference between expert diagnosis incidental to a report
of a patient's illness and an expert opinion on any other subject?
In any event, once Forward Communications concluded that expert reports were
not covered by 803(6), it should have excluded the appraiser's report on the ground that
803(6) did not cover such reports and that the appraiser was not in court to testify.
Instead, the court injected an element of confusion when it concluded that the report was
inadmissible because the record did not contain any evidence of the appraiser's
qualifications or even his identity and therefore the report did not meet Rule 702's
requirements. Id. at 511. Was the court backtracking on its view that 803(6) does not
cover reports of experts? In other words, would it have admitted the report if the
proponent had adduced evidence of the preparer's qualifications to express the expert
opinions? Finally, it should be noted that the plaintiff offered no testimony to show that
the appraisal was created as part of the appraisal firm's regularly conducted business. Id.
238. See supra note 5. The Advisory Committee's Note to 803(6) does not
mention this difference.
In dealing with opinions or diagnoses under the Model Act, an initial question of
statutory interpretation arises because it only refers to a memorandum or record of any
act, transaction, or occurrence and does not mention opinions or diagnoses. Cases under
the Act are split as to whether it applies to opinions or diagnoses. K.P. Knudsen v.
Duffee-Freeman, 99 S.E. 2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957). See People v. Kohlmeyer, 31
N.E.2d 490 (N.Y. 1940) (holding hospital records containing doctor's diagnosis of
patient's mental condition admissible under New York's business records statute). But
among those cases that indicate it does apply, there is a further split as to the
admissibility of a doctor's diagnostic opinion or the results of a scientific test which
requires a special expertise as distinguished from routine diagnoses and scientific tests.
See Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 359-60 (4th Cir. 1962).
239. See supra note 5.
240. The Commonwealth Fund Report noted that the then-existing English and
American Business Entries Rule "presupposes testimonial qualification of the entrant or
declarant, so that the entrant or declarant must have personal knowledge of the subject
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that its purpose is limited to removing only a hearsay objection, the statute's
history indicates that the drafters were focusing only on the hearsay obstacle that
prevented regular business entries from being received in evidence without
calling every person in the business who participated in making the entries.24'
Courts have addressed this issue under the Model Act and have limited the
evidentiary scope of the Act to the hearsay arena.242 For example, after noting
that a police officer could not be permitted to testify in court about his
conclusions as to the cause of a collision, the New York Appellate Division held
that his written conclusions in a police report should be excluded because "the
business entry lifts the barrier of the hearsay objection, it does not overcome any
'
other exclusionary rule which might properly be invoked."243
Thus, if an

matter of the entry or declaration." See MORGAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 53. Nowhere
in its report did the Committee hint that its proposed Model Act did not also presuppose
testimonial qualifications, such as personal knowledge on the part of the entrant or
declarant as the then existing business entries rule did. See also Continental Baking Co.
v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 148 (6th Cir. 1960) (holding that documents admissib!P,
under Section 1732 "must also be competent and relevant").
241. MORGAN, ET AL., supra note 2, at 51. See In re Coddington's Will, 120
N.E.2d 777, 784 (N.Y. 1954) (stating that purpose of The Model Act "was to overcome
the objection of the hearsay rule").
242. See Powell v. Brady, 496 P.2d 328, 332 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that
Section 1732 applied in Colorado state court "does not abandon the requirement that the

relevancy of the tendered record be established"); Reynolds v. State, 633 A.2d 455, 45960 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding an opinion that hospital record is inadmissible if
it would be excluded with the expert on the witness stand); Murray v. Donlan, 433
N.Y.S. 2d 184, 190 (N.Y. 1980) (holding police officer's post-accident opinion in
accident report as to cause of accident inadmissible because, among other things, there
was no proof that he was qualified to do an expert analysis of the physical evidence or
to render an opinion based on such analysis); Toll v. State, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 589, 591 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1969); Coddington, 120 N.E.2d at 784. See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4518,
commentaries at C4518:4 (McKinney 1992) (stating that "regularly recorded opinions
should be admissible to the same extent they would be admissible if the opinion holder
were testifying at trial"); RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 235 (Jerome Prince ed., 9th ed.
1964) (stating that N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4518 (a) "does not overcome any other exclusionary
rule").
The same appears to be the case under the UBRE. See Williams v. McClain, 520
A.2d 1374, 1376-77 (Pa. 1987) (stating that where record does not show that social
worker was qualified to make diagnosis contained in her report, her opinion was
inadmissible under Pennsylvania's business record exception adopted from UBRE; to
admit the evidence when it would not be admissible if she testified in court would be
contrary to purposes of the exception); In re Wildoner, 407 A.2d 1351, 1354 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1979) (stating that business records admissible under Pennsylvania's business record
exception "must not be violative of other evidentiary rules").
243. Toll v. State, 299 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
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objection is made, a proponent should be required 244
to show that the business
records also satisfy other relevant evidentiary rules.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts should adhere more closely to the requirements set forth in business
records exception codifications. This should particularly be true with 803(6)
because Congress amended the Supreme Court's text and insisted on including
an express regular practice requirement as an additional guarantee of
trustworthiness. No doubt Congress did not intend for courts to pay only lip
service to this requirement, as courts have done. Significant language
differences in the various codifications of the business records exception should
mean something. Courts must flesh out the foundation requirements and spell
out the criteria that must be met in order to satisfy those requirements. They
must be more analytical and more precise in applying those requirements in
determining a document's admissibility under a given exception. Unless courts
do this, results will not differ despite differences in the codified language, and
litigants will not have a solid basis to predict admissibility. Of course, despite
language differences, courts may interpret the different codifications to impose
substantially the same requirements because, in the final analysis, the key
language in each codification is the requirement that the document be made in
the regular course of business. As we have seen, this language may be
interpreted as including a regular practice requirement, and as requiring both that
the entrant be under a duty to enter and that the declarant be under a duty to
report.
More careful analysis and greater adherence to the codified language will
likely produce greater consistency. 245 At the same time, it will give litigants a
much better idea of whether they will succeed in having a document admitted

244. It is not clear whether the proponent must introduce evidence independent of
the document or whether the document itself may establish the qualifications. See CAL.
EVID. CODE § 720(a) (West 1996) (stating that proponent must first show expert qualified
if opponent objects to expert testifying); Williams, 520 A.2d at 1376-77; Reynolds, 633

A.2d at 459 (stating that record itself must show that person is qualified to express expert
opinion and that there was an adequate factual basis for it); Abraham P. Ordover, Expert
Testimony: A ProposedCodefor New York, 19 N.Y.L.F. 809, 814 (1974) (stating that

proposed requirement that proponent has burden of showing expert witness's
qualifications is codification of existing New York law). But cf Thomas v. Hogan, 308
F.2d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 1962) (stating there is presumption that diagnosis and scientific
tests are properly made by qualified personnel if the recorded information [in hospital
record] reflects usual routine of hospital"); Marlow v. Cerino, 313 A.2d 505, 514 (Md.

Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (holding opinion in hospital record admissible where it appears
from such record that person qualified to give opinion; inference arises that physician
diagnosis made by qualified person if it is established that hospital record is from

reputable hospital of high standards).
245. It may also result in a decrease of business documents admissible under the
exception.
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under a given exception. However, given the limitless variety of documents that
businesses prepare, and that many such documents may not fit neatly into the
foundation requirements, courts should be allowed some flexibility in dealing
with unusual documents. More specifically, the exception should be expanded
to give courts discretion to admit documents not otherwise admissible under
803(6) or a similar exception where the documents were made in the regular
course of business by an entrant using information transmitted by a declarant
with personal knowledge, provided: (i) the business substantially relied on the
information in conducting its business affairs with persons other than the
declarant, and the declarant transmitted the information in the regular course of
declarant's business,246 or (ii) the business verified the information and
substantially relied on it in the regular conduct of its business. Finally, the
business duty requirement should be codified to eliminate any question as to its
applicability, and consideration should be given to adopting New Jersey's Rule
808,247 which excludes expert opinions in business records unless the trial court
finds that the circumstances involved in rendering the opinions establish their
trustworthiness.

246. This would cover situations such as those present in Leroy v. Sabena Belgian
World Airlines Inc., 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965) and NortheastBank Trust Co. v. Soley,

481 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1984). See supra notes 159, 163 and accompanying text. But, it
would not cover a document that a bank prepared based on a financial statement that a
borrower gave the bank even though the bank relied on the financial statement in making
a loan to the borrower.
247. N.J. R. EvID. 803(8).

